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For an Anti-discrimination Act for Cyberspace: 
Two-Sided Pricing, Walled Gardens, and the 




In the wake of renewed policy interest for the regulation of Internet 
gatekeepers, I argue that the U.S. Congress should pass a sweeping net 
neutrality regulation, an Anti-Discrimination Act for Cyberspace.  Breaking 
with the tradition of siloed research which has seen similar proposals 
grounded in economics, computer science, history, political philosophy, and 
administrative and constitutional law, as separate matters, I offer a multi-
disciplinary approach which combines these fields to draw new insights for 
Internet law and policy.  I argue, with reference to leading Supreme Court 
cases, including Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, that such a law 
would most likely pass First and Fifth Amendment constitutional muster, 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The freedom of the mind which befits the members of a self-governing 
society is not a given and fixed part of human nature. It can be increased … 
by bringing [men] together in activities of communication and mutual 
understanding.  And the federal legislature is not forbidden to engage in that 
positive enterprise of cultivating the general intelligence upon which the 
success of self-government so obviously depends.  On the contrary, in that 
positive field the Congress of the United States has a heavy and basic 
responsibility to promote the freedom of speech. 
 
Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-
Government, 19481 
 
It will be up to federal and state policy makers … to reconcile the 
competing corporate interests and to create a network that maximizes the 
benefits enjoyed by all Americans… Adequate federal … leadership will give 
us the power to leverage the millions of dollars into something greater than 
the sum of its parts. 
 
Al Gore, Infrastructure for the Global Village, 19912 
 
A lot of [Internet freedom] has to be enforced by the government, and 
conservative types and libertarian types say “government shouldn’t have any 
say and control over that, that takes away our freedom.”  Wrong!  It takes 
away the freedom of the companies that are taking away the freedom from 
us. 
 
Steve Wozniak, interview by Russia Today, 20123 
 
On July 9, 2021, President Joe Biden signed an Executive Order 
encouraging the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) to restore 
the net neutrality rules adopted by the FCC in 2015 under the Obama 
administration and undone in 2017 by Chairman Ajit Pai’s FCC under the 
 
1. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948), 
reprinted in ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 19-20 (1948) (1960). 
2. Al Gore, Infrastructure for the Global Village, 265 SCI. AM. 111 (1991). 
3. Steve Wozniak Interview, Web crackdown coming, freedom failing, RUSSIA TODAY (Aug. 14, 
2012, 7:27-8:57), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LJnghGBBP2Q (transcript by author). 
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Trump administration.4  The 2015 Open Internet Order (the “2015 Order”)5 
had classified Internet service providers (ISPs) as common carriers under 
Title II of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and, on this basis, imposed 
on them no blocking, no throttling, and no paid prioritization rules.  In 
practice, this prevented ISPs from implementing two-sided pricing models: 
a model where the ISP charges not only the end-user in order to access the 
Internet, but also the sender of content which the user is trying to access.  
Where the content provider refuses to pay, or otherwise is disfavored by the 
ISP for business, political reasons, or others, the ISP simply blocks or 
throttles (slows down) the disfavored content, making it either impossible of 
very difficult for the user to access the content at stake.  At the heart of this 
model is discrimination: a sender of content which is disfavored by the ISP 
is blocked.  Two-sided pricing models, then, are referred to as “non-neutral,” 
and are incompatible with an open Internet.  Despite the fact that net 
neutrality violations before the 2015 Order had been numerous and well 
documented,6 and that an overwhelming and bipartisan majority of 
Americans opposed repealing net neutrality regulations,7 in 2017, the FCC 
repealed the net neutrality regulations that outlawed two-sided pricing 
models, and, generally, blocking, throttling, or paid prioritization, in an order 
hypocritically named the Restoring Internet Freedom Order (the “2017 
Order”).8  At the time the Biden Executive Order was released in July 2021, 
the FCC was deadlocked at two Democratic and two Republican votes.  A 
 
4. Specifically, “the Chair of the Federal Communications Commission is encouraged to work with 
the rest of the Commission, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, to consider: (i) adopting 
through appropriate rulemaking ‘Net Neutrality’ rules similar to those previously adopted under title II 
of the Communications Act of 1934 (Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as 47 U.S.C. §151 et 
seq.), as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, in ‘Protecting and Promoting the Open 
Internet,’” 80 Fed. Reg. 19738 (Apr. 13, 2015); Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the 
American Economy (July 9, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-
actions/2021/07/09/executive-order-on-promoting-competition-in-the-american-economy/.  See also 
FACT SHEET: Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy (July 9, 2021), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/07/09/fact-sheet-executive-order-
on-promoting-competition-in-the-american-economy/.  See also Timothy Karr, Biden Executive Order 
Calls on the FCC to Restore Net Neutrality and Promote Broadband Competition, FREE PRESS (July 9, 
2021), https://www.freepress.net/news/press-releases/biden-executive-order-urges-fcc-restore-net-
neutrality-and-promote-broadband-competition. 
5. See generally In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, WC Docket No. 14-
28, Report and Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015), 
https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-releases-open-internet-order. 
6. Timothy Karr, Net Neutrality Violations: A Brief History, FREE PRESS (July 9, 2021), 
https://www.freepress.net/our-response/expert-analysis/explainers/net-neutrality-violations-brief-
history. 
7. Overwhelming Bipartisan Majority Opposes Repealing Net Neutrality, UNIVERSITY OF 
MARYLAND PROGRAM FOR PUBLIC CONSULTATION (Dec. 12, 2017), 
https://publicconsultation.org/united-states/overwhelming-bipartisan-majority-opposes-repealing-net-
neutrality/. 
8. See generally In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, WC Docket No. 17-108 (2017), 
Declaratory Ruling, Report and Order, and Order, 33 FCC Rcd. 311 (2017), 
https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-releases-restoring-internet-freedom-order. 
Winter 2021             FOR AN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACT FOR CYBERSPACE 45 
fifth commissioner being confirmed by the Senate in the months to come 
would give the Democrats the advantage they need to successfully, one more 
time, reclassify ISPs as common carriers under Title II and impose net 
neutrality regulations on that basis.  However, it is likely that yet another 
reversal of FCC classification would lead to what an attorney for the NCTA, 
the ISPs and cable television trade association, had already dubbed in 2014 
“‘World War III’ and years of litigation.”9  This article, then explores another 
path towards net neutrality, that of federal legislation.  I argue that Congress 
should break the Gordian Knot created by layers of legislation, 
administrative regulations, and years never-ending litigation, and pass a 
sweeping net neutrality law from a blank slate: an Anti-Discrimination Act 
for Cyberspace.10 
There is significant momentum for such legislation.  Seven states have 
already adopted their own net neutrality legislation (California, Colorado, 
Maine, New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington).  Several others are 
set to discuss bills during the 2021 legislative session (including 
Connecticut, Kentucky, Missouri, New York, and South Carolina).11  
Further, issues of Internet governance and of the possible regulation of 
gatekeepers have found renewed interest in the public eye when former 
President Trump, in July 2021, sued Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, over 
the suspension of his social media accounts.  Trump, in his own words, asked 
the court “to order an immediate halt to social media companies’ illegal, 
shameful censorship of the American people . . .. . . We’re demanding an end 
to the shadow banning, a stop to the silencing and a stop to the blacklisting, 
banishing and canceling that you know so well.”12  Meanwhile, a flurry of 
new state legislation and of lawsuits, from Florida to Ohio, is seeking to 
prevent “Big Tech,” read, content companies such as Google or Facebook, 
from banning users or banning certain content, from “fake news” to certain 
flavors of political speech.13  At first glance, the constitutional legal issues 
 
9. Kery Murakami, Section 706 or Title II Debated at net neutrality discussion, COMMUNICATIONS 
DAILY, July 25, 2014, at 5-6.  For an in-depth discussion of the various administrative and constitutional 
law arguments being made in favor of and against imposing net neutrality regulations under Title II, see 
Barbara Cherry & Julien Mailland, Toward Sustainable Network-Openness Obligations on Broadband in 
the U.S.: Surviving Providers First Amendment Challenges, TELECOMMUNICATION POLICY RESEARCH 
CONFERENCE (TPRC), George Mason University School of Law, Arlington, VA (Sept. 13, 2014), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2417758. 
10. I refer here not just to the Greek legend, but to the telecommunications policy staple.  See 
generally W. RUSSELL NEUMAN, LEE MCKNIGHT & RICHARD SOLOMON, THE GORDIAN KNOT: 
POLITICAL GRIDLOCK ON THE INFORMATION HIGHWAY (1997). 
11. State Net Neutrality Laws May Lead to Federal Legislation, THE NATIONAL L. REV. (Mar. 1, 
2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/state-net-neutrality-laws-may-lead-to-federal-legislation. 
12. Donald Trump Sues Facebook, YouTube And Twitter For Alleged Censorship, NPR (July 7, 
2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/07/07/1013760153/donald-trump-says-he-is-suing-facebook-google-
and-twitter-for-alleged-censorship. 
13. See, e.g., Ari Cohn, Trading Big Tech For Big Government Will Backfire For Conservatives, 
DAILY CALLER (June 2, 2021), https://dailycaller.com/2021/06/02/cohn-trading-big-tech-for-big-
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raised by the “big tech” discussion are the same as that of the net neutrality 
debate: can the government lawfully prevent the suppression of speech by 
Internet gatekeepers through no blocking, no discrimination, or must-carry 
legislation?  In reality, however, an Internet gatekeeper is only afforded First 
Amendment protection if they have “engaged in a form of protected 
expression,” that is, if their activity is “sufficiently imbued with elements of 
communication to fall within the scope [of the First Amendment]” (Spence 
v. Washington).14  Unfortunately, this crucial preliminary question of 
determining the scope of First Amendment protection of a gatekeeper is too 
often overlooked, including by proponents of net neutrality regulation.15  In 
the case at hand, social media companies and Internet service providers are 
in two completely different situations.  Social media companies are in the 
business of creating and curating content, just like newspapers did in an 
analog age, and, as such, are afforded the utmost First Amendment 
protections, something which will most likely doom any effort to impose 
anti-discrimination rules upon them.  As a commentator for Wired Magazine  
noted, “[t]he whole value proposition for Google is that it discriminates 
between different possible results in order to return what it thinks will be 
most relevant to the person doing the search.  To ask the court to force 
Google ‘to carry search result information reliably, neutrally,’ as the Ohio 
lawsuit does, is sort of nonsensical.”16  In contrast, ISPs, whose business 
model is simply to carry the speech of others, are no more speakers, from a 
First Amendment perspective, than the post office that carries letters.17  
Therefore, the body of case law that applies to ISPs as conduits, and not 
speakers, is entirely different from the one that applies to content creators or 
 
government-will-backfire-for-conservatives/; Gilad Edelman, No, Facebook and Google Are Not Public 
Utilities, WIRED (July 15, 2021), https://www.wired.com/story/no-facebook-google-not-public-utilities/. 
14. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11(1974). 
15. Nicholas Bramble, Ill Telecommunications: How Internet Infrastructure Providers Lose First 
Amendment Protection, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 67, 68 (2010). 
16. Gilad Edelman, No, Facebook and Google Are Not Public Utilities, WIRED (July 15, 2021), 
https://www.wired.com/story/no-facebook-google-not-public-utilities/. 
17. As the FCC noted in the 2015 Order, “Consistent with our determination in the 2010 Open 
Internet Order, we find that when broadband providers offer broadband Internet access services, they act 
as conduits for the speech of others, not as speakers themselves.” 2015 FCC Open Internet Order at 268, 
30 FCC Rcd 5601 (2015), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-15-24A1.pdf (citing Reply 
Comments of Professor Barbara A. Cherry & Assistant Professor Julien Mailland, Before the Federal 
Communications Commission Washington, D.C. 20554, Re: In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting 
the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 14-28; Framework for Broadband Internet Service, GN Docket No. 
10-27; Preserving the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 09-191; Broadband Industry Practices, WC Docket 
no. 07-52 (September 2013)).  See generally Nicholas Bramble, Ill Telecommunications: How Internet 
Infrastructure Providers Lose First Amendment Protection, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 67, 
68 (2010); see also an acknowledgment by Verizon’s lawyers that ISPs are conduits and not speakers: 
“the Internet service provider performs a pure transmission or “conduit” function . . .. . . This function is 
analogous to the role played by common carriers in transmitting information selected and controlled by 
others. Traditionally, this passive role of conduit for the expression of others has not created any duties 
or liabilities under the copyright laws.”  Brief for Appellant at 23, Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. 
Verizon Internet Serv., 351 F.3d. 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Nos. 03-7015 & 03-7053). 
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curators.  This article focuses on net neutrality regulations that would apply 
to ISPs, not to the regulation of content platforms such as Google or 
Facebook.  But the fact that policy issues such as the potential regulation of 
Internet gatekeepers, in general, have gained the renewed interest of 
legislators and interest groups on both sides of the political spectrum, makes 
the present argument in favor of a federal net neutrality legislation applicable 
to ISPs all the more timely. 
I am certainly not the first to argue for such legislation.  But as we have 
just noted, complex legal issues are too often conflated, and oversimplified, 
in order to fit political agendas or even simply to surf the hype and keep up 
with the speed of the news cycle.  As a few net neutrality researchers from 
the field of computer science have noted, policymakers often “prefer a 
simple answer to what amounts to a difficult and complicated, 
multidisciplinary, set of questions.”18  And here lies the complexity of 
creating sound net neutrality policy: the fact that the issue is, at its core, 
multidisciplinary, whereas research on the topic tends to be siloed: in 
electrical engineering and computer science journals, in economic journals, 
in historical societies, and in law reviews.  In contrast, this article grounds a 
legal argument, that a federal Anti-Discrimination Act for Cyberspace is 
desirable and would pass constitutional muster, in computer science, 
economics, history, political theory, and, of course, constitutional law, and 
draws new insights for Internet law and policy by combining lessons learned 
from these fields.  In Part I, I draw from the economics literature to provide 
an overview of what one-sided v. two-sided pricing models are, and how 
they apply to the information industry, both traditional and in an Internet 
setting.  I show how and why the Internet industry has bloomed under a one-
sided pricing model, and how for ISPs to apply a two-sided model would 
create a radical shift in economic paradigm for the entire Internet ecosystem.  
In Part II, I tie the economic literature on net neutrality to that of the 
computer science field, and draw insights with regard to freedom of speech.  
I demonstrate how the systematic implementation of two-sided pricing 
models by ISPs would drastically affect how the Internet works and be 
incompatible, as a matter of principle, with an open Internet.  I debunk ISPs’ 
claims that two-sided pricing model would not impact any speaker 
negatively because the ISPs would always leave open a free slow lane, and 
demonstrate how such models actually incentivize ISPs to degrade service 
rather than invest in network upgrade.  The very logic of two-sided pricing, 
as applied to data networks, is to block data, by default, from entering the 
receiver’s local network, because senders of data are only incentivized to pay 
an end-user’s local ISP if that ISP implements censorship by default, which 
 
18. Steven Bauer, David D. Clark & William Lehr, The Evolution of Internet Congestion 29, TPRC 
2009 (Aug. 15, 2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1999830 (emphasis added). 
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can only be lifted in exchange for payment.  This, in turn, will have an impact 
on the wealth of ideas available in the marketplace, lest strong net neutrality 
protections banning two-sided pricing models in the open Internet be put in 
place.  I take this idea further in Part III, where I show what has happened, 
in history, to the ability of users to access content, and the ability of 
independent content providers to distribute their creations, when barriers 
have been erected around last-mile networks.  Drawing from industry 
publications of the 1980s and early 1990s, and giving specific attention to 
walled gardens such as AOL, Compuserve, and Prodigy, I demonstrate that 
the walled gardens model led to a balkanized online market and a paucity of 
content, which in turn explained the extremely low penetration of online 
services in the U.S. retail market, roughly 1% by the time the World Wide 
Web was invented, in contrast to countries such as France, which, with their 
relatively-open Minitel system, was the most connected country in the world 
at the time.  As Sir Tim Berners Lee, inventor of the Web, once put it, “when 
you erect a wall around the garden, we know now all the flowers bloom 
outside the wall, not inside.”19  A reversal towards those walled gardens 
model, caused by the very logic of two-sided pricing models, creates a 
depletion of the marketplace of ideas, both in terms of sheer volume of 
information being able to pass through to users, and in terms of plurality of 
views.  This issue is exacerbated by the fact that a significant part of the 
rhetoric around Internet policy in the past twenty years has revolved around 
for-profit uses of the Internet.  In Part IV, I show through rhetorical analysis 
how we have lost track of “the little guy,” users/content creators who use the 
open network of networks as an electronic soap box.  The empowering nature 
of the Internet has largely been reduced to “consumer empowerment” in the 
dominant Internet policy narratives, both against and in favor of net 
neutrality.  Where in 1997, the Reno court had focused on the role of the 
Internet as for anyone, including educational institutions, commercial 
entities, advocacy groups, and individuals to publish information,20 the 
2010,21 2015, and 2017 Orders oppose “users” to commercial “edge 
providers,” the latter being presented as the source of content that matters.  
This section sets the stage for Part V.  I draw from the political philosophy 
of Alexander Meiklejohn, whose interpretation of the meaning of the First 
Amendment is a controlling force in positive law and underpins leading 
Supreme Court cases that have expanded the freedom of political speech for 
 
19. John Cox, Tim Berners-Lee Warns of ‘Walled Gardens’ for Mobile Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
15, 2007), 
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/idg/IDG_002570DE00740E1800257394004818F5.htm. 
20. Reno v. Am. C. L. Union, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997). 
21. See generally In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet, Broadband Industry Practices, GN 
Docket No. 09-191 & WC Docket No. 07-52, Rep. and Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 1834 (2010), 
https://www.fcc.gov/document/preserving-open-internet-broadband-industry-practices-0. 
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Americans, from Terminiello v. Chicago,22 to the so-called Skokie case 
where neo-nazis were allowed to march on a public square,23 to Pruneyard 
Shopping Center v. Robins,24 where a state constitutional provision which 
permitted individuals to exercise free speech rights on the property of a 
privately-owned shopping center passed constitutional muster under both the 
First and the Fifth Amendment.  I make detailed comparisons between the 
locus of the old soap box, the shopping center, to that of the electronic soap-
box, the ISPs facilities, to show that a net neutrality law that would protect 
the right of all speakers, on a content-neutral basis, to pass their speech 
through the last-mile ISP, would most likely pass constitutional muster under 
the Pruneyard three-prong test.  I conclude that in an age where the digital 
public forum is controlled by private entities, an Act of Congress that would 
ensure net neutrality by prohibiting the implementation of two-sided pricing 
models by ISPs, an Anti-Discrimination Act for Cyberspace, is desirable and 
legitimated by controlling political philosophy rhetoric in the field of free 
speech and Supreme Court precedent. 
II. WHAT IS 2-SIDED PRICING, AND HOW DOES IT DIFFER FROM THE 
TRADITIONAL PRICING MODEL IN A NEUTRAL, OPEN INTERNET? 
Two-sided pricing generally refers to a model where the operator of a 
two-sided market charges a fee to participants at both ends of the market.  A 
two-sided market can itself be defined as “one in which 1) two sets of agents 
interact through an intermediary or platform, and 2) the decisions of each set 
of agents affect the outcomes of the other set of agents, typically through an 
externality.”25  A typical example in the economics literature is that of a 
straight-singles bar, where two sets of agents (straight single males and 
females) interact through a mating platform (the bar), and where the number 
of participants in each side of the market affects the outcomes of the other 
set of participants: the more females are present in the bar, the greater the 
benefits – externalities - for males, and vice-versa.  Other typical examples 
include video game consoles (where players and game makers interact 
through the console acting as a platform),26 newspapers, and credit card 
systems.27  The existence of a two-sided market does not in itself imply two-
sided pricing.  For example, a broadcast television station, as a platform that 
 
22. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). 
23. Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). 
24. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
25. Marc Rysman, The Economics of Two-Sided Markets, 23 J. OF ECON. PERSPS. 125 (2009). 
26. Note that the literature on video game consoles and online systems as platforms is also extensive 
in the academic field of Science and Technology Studies and has in particular been the focus of MIT 
Press’ Platform Studies book series.  See, e.g., DOMINIC ARSENAULT, SUPER POWER, SPOONY BARDS, 
AND SILVERWARE: THE SUPER NINTENDO ENTERTAINMENT SYSTEM (2017) (discussing the economic 
model of the Nintendo platform); see also JULIEN MAILLAND & KEVIN DRISCOLL, MINITEL: WELCOME 
TO THE INTERNET (2017) (discussing the economic models of the Minitel platform). 
27. Rysman, supra note 25, at 128. 
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delivers programing to viewers (also known as “eyeballs” in that industry) 
at the bottom side of the market, and eyeballs to advertisers at the top side of 
the market, only charges a dollar fee to participants at the top side of the 
market (the advertisers) but not at the bottom side of the market (although 
viewers are donating their time and attention to the platform, which is 
technically a fee, they are not charged a dollar amount).  A straight-singles 
bar can chose to apply a one-sided pricing model by not charging one class 
of participants (usually females) to prime the pump, reach critical mass, enter 
a positive feedback loop and attract paying participants at the other side of 
the market (males), and succeed over a competing straight-singles bar that 
might have applied a two-sided pricing model by charging both males and 
females an entry fee, therefore creating barriers to entry on both ends of the 
market rather than just one.  Other examples of one-sided pricing models in 
two-sided markets include free newspaper models, and yellow pages 
directories,28 where advertisers, but nor readers, are charged a dollar fee.  
However, the information industry and a number of other industries also 
offer plenty of examples of two-sided markets where two-sided pricing 
models involving exchanges of dollars on both ends are applied.  A 
traditional newspaper charges both readers and advertisers; a credit card 
company often charges both a yearly fee to the cardholder and a transaction 
fee to the merchant. 
Internet access facilities are themselves two-sided markets because, 
referring to the earlier definition, 1) they provide a platform (a transmission 
service) through which two sets of agents (the sender and the receiver of 
information), interact, and 2) the decisions of each set of agents affect the 
outcomes of the other set of agents through an externality.  In this particular 
case, the more end-users connect to the Internet, the more people content 
providers can reach, and the more content providers connect and spread data 
through the networks, the more informational value each end-user will derive 
from their respective Internet connection.  From a pricing standpoint, the 
Internet has historically functioned as a one-sided pricing model, where ISPs 
only charge end-users at the level of the last mile,29 that is, the local network 
the ISP controls, irrelevant of whether the end-user is mainly a receiver of 
information or a sender of information, but do not charge outside senders of 
incoming content for entering that last mile and reaching the end-user.30  
 
28. Rysman, supra note 25, at 129. 
29. John Musacchio, Galina Schwartz & Jean Walrand, A Two-Sided Market Analysis of Provider 
Investment Incentives with an Application to the Net-Neutrality Issue, 8 REV. OF NETWORK ECON., no.1, 
2009, at 1-2.  See also Nicholas Economides & Joachim Tag, Network Neutrality on the Internet: A Two-
Sided Market Analysis, 24 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 91, 91-92 (2012). 
30. See, e.g., Nicholas Economides & Benjamin E. Hermalin, The Economics of Network Neutrality, 
43 THE RAND J. OF ECON. 613 (2012) (“Since its commercialization in the mid-1990s, a party (website 
or household) connecting to the Internet pays only its direct provider of access.”). Note, in the added 
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Under this traditional model, then, “[w]hile users and content providers each 
pay their own ISPs for connectivity, neither need pay other ISPs in order to 
reach their customers.”31  One of the key implications of this model is that it 
has enabled the implementation of the “‘end-to-end principle’ that has 
governed the Internet since its inception,” under which “computers attached 
to the Internet that are sending and receiving information packets did not 
need to know the structure of the network and could just interact end-to-
end.”32  In this particular case, the sender’s computer does not need to have 
a direct relationship with the receiver’s ISP to communicate with the 
receiver’s computer, because the receiver’s ISP is not implementing a two-
sided pricing model and charging the sender of data.  Conversely, 
interference with the flow of data, for example in the form of a two-sided 
pricing model, puts the end-to-end principle in jeopardy.33  Let us examine a 
visual representation of a traditional Internet architecture and data flow to 
grasp the import of this one-sided pricing implementation. 
 
emphasis, how the authors do not oppose websites or households, but rather treat them as the same type 
of agent, in this case, an entity that connects to a direct provider of access. 
31. Nicholas Economides, Why imposing new tolls on third-party content and applications 
threatens innovation and will not improve broadband providers’ investment, in NET NEUTRALITY: 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DEBATE 86, 88 (Jorge Perez Martinez ed., 2010).  See also John Musacchio, 
Galina Schwartz & Jean Walrand, A Two-Sided Market Analysis of Provider Investment Incentives with 
an Application to the Net-Neutrality Issue, 8 REV. OF NETWORK ECON., no. 1, 2009, at 1, 3 (“[I]n a model 
with one-sided pricing, end users and content providers pay only for their direct access . . .. . . . Thus, 
with one-sided pricing, content provider C1 pays only ISP T1 for its access to the Internet but does not 
pay any of the other ISPs.”). 
32. Nicholas Economides & Joachim Tag, Network Neutrality on the Internet: A Two-Sided Market 
Analysis, 24 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 2012, at 88.  See generally the seminal papers on the end-to-end 
principle: J.H. Saltzer, D. P. Reed, and D. D. Clark, End-to-End Arguments in System Design, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING SYSTEMS 
509, PARIS, FRANCE, APR. 8–10, 1981, IEEE COMPUTER SOCIETY (1981); J.H. Saltzer, D. P. Reed & D. 
D. Clark, End-to-End Arguments in System Design, 2 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUT. SYS. 277 
(1984). 
33. See, e.g., Joint Comments of Internet Engineers, Pioneers, and Technologists on the Technical 
Flaws in the FCC’s Notice of Proposed Rule-making and the Need for the Light-Touch, Bright-Line 
Rules from the Open Internet Order at 21, 82 Fed. Reg. 105 (proposed May 18, 2017) (to be codified at 
47 CFR pt. 8 and 20), WC Docket No. 17-108 (2017), https://www.eff.org/document/internet-engineers-
commentsfcc-nn (“Given the end-to-end principle, any service that appears on the Internet will be 
available to ISP customers. However, the end-to-end principle depends on noninterference by ISPs. If the 
FCC reclassifies BIAS providers as information services and is unable to enforce light-touch rules against 
ISP interference with customer traffic, many new capabilities the FCC has not envisioned will never come 
to be.”). 
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Figure 1: Physical representation of Internet interconnection34 
The Internet is not one network but a network of networks, managed by a 
number of different entities in different countries, which hand data off to 
each other, so that data moves from one end-user connected through her last 
mile, local ISP, to another end-user connected through his own local ISP, 
which is often a different ISP from the first one.  In this model, each end-
user pays a fee to her local ISP, and only to that ISP.  In turn, she can either 
receive information, send information, or both.  Typically, the more 
information the user wants to send or receive, the bigger the “pipe” that user 
will want to connect to, and the more the last-mile ISP will charge.  A person 
who only wants to connect to the Internet to read text-only email should be 
satisfied with a 56k dial-up service.  A casual Netflix viewer only needs a 
half a megabit per second connection, 5 Mbps for HD streaming.35  A gamer 
who has no tolerance for latency will require a faster connection, and a large 
corporation such as Netflix sending a tremendous amount of information 
through the ether will want to connect directly to a T1 backbone provider 
that can provide large enough bandwidth for Netflix to push its content out 
to many different receivers connected to many different local ISPs.36  The 
 
34. kc claffy and D. Clark, Platform Models for Sustainable Internet Regulation, TPRC 41: THE 
41ST RESEARCH CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATION, INFORMATION AND INTERNET POLICY (2013) 
(noting that the Internet is constantly in flux, and, in particular, that the traditional model has “flattened” 
over the years, particularly with the introduction of content delivery networks (CDNs), something that is 
discussed in detailed in the article cited herewith – this point, however, is besides the scope of the present 
article, and the traditional representation of the Internet interconnection model suffices for the arguments 
at hand). 
35. Internet Connection Speed Recommendations, NETFLIX, https://help.netflix.com/en/node/306 
(last visited Aug. 13, 2021). 
36. Or they might instead want to use content delivery networks (CDNs) close to locales where it 
operates.  See, e.g., kc claffy and D. Clark, Platform Models for Sustainable Internet Regulation, TPRC 
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more the bandwidth, whether upstream (data being sent) or downstream 
(data being received), the more the user will be charged by its last-mile 
Internet access facility operator.  Also note that in the early days of the public 
Internet, price differentiation through versioning in this one-sided pricing 
model was implemented by using minutes, rather than bandwidth, as the 
measurement unit.37  But in either case, even when it implemented price-
discrimination schemes, the network operator only ever charged end-users at 
one end of the market, that is, at the end of the last mile that it itself controls.  
The way the data is handed off between operators at the core of the network 
of networks is of no concern to either the sender or the receiver.  In other 
words, a user in Germany wanting to send an email to his cousin in the US 
only needs to pay a fee to his local German ISP for the message to be 
received by the cousin who is likewise paying a fee to his local US ISP.  The 
process is the same if the German cousin, instead of using his Internet access 
to send out emails, uses it to hook a blog, a personal webpage, or a small 
business webpage it hosts on his local computer, to the Internet at large.  In 
both cases, communication is established between the German sender of 
content and the US receiver of content through a single payment by the 
sender to his ISP and a single payment by the receiver to his ISP (Figure 2). 
 
 
41: THE 41ST RESEARCH CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATION, INFORMATION AND INTERNET POLICY 
(2013). 
37. For example, in 1996 AOL dialup subscribers paid $19.95 for the first 20 hours, and $2.95 for 
each additional hour.  See Steven Bauer, David D. Clark and William Lehr, The Evolution of Internet 
Congestion 14, TPRC 2009 (Aug. 15, 2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1999830. 
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Figure 2: Data flows from one user to the other by being handed off from 
one another by the various operators (ISPs) located at the core of the 
network, with whom the end users have no relationship.  The one-sided 
pricing implementation enables virtual communication between end-users 
connected to the Internet through separate ISPs and who pay a fee only to 
their local ISP.38 
 
In other words, applying a one-sided pricing model to a two-sided market 
has enabled anyone in the world at the bottom side of their local two-sided 
market, by paying one single fee to their local ISP, to exchange information 
with anyone else in the world who has also connected to the Internet by 
paying one single fee to their local ISP.  This was a major departure from 
previous online models, where subscribers to services such as AOL or 
CompuServe could only access content produced by other market 
participants who had a direct contractual relationship with AOL or 
CompuServe. We will return to the discussion of AOL and CompuServe 
being walled gardens, and the implications of such models on the 
marketplace of ideas and democratic discourse, in Part III.  For now, let us 
examine how a shift in pricing models from one to two-sided impacts 
Internet architecture and data flow, and what the consequences of such a shift 
are, in turn, for the end-users. 
III.  TWO-SIDED PRICING AFFECTS INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND 
OPERATIONS IN MORE THAN A FINANCIAL WAY 
In this section, I demonstrate how the systematic implementation of 
two-sided pricing models by ISPs would drastically affect how the Internet 
works.  This, in turn, would have an impact on the wealth of ideas available 
in the marketplace.  The very logic of two-sided pricing, as applied to data 
networks, is to block data, by default, from entering the receiver’s local 
network, because senders of data are only incentivized to pay an end-user’s 
local ISP if that ISP implements censorship by default, which can only be 
lifted in exchange for payment.  Two-sided pricing models, therefore, are by 
definition incompatible with net neutrality.  This explains why the economic 
literature sometimes explicitly refers to one-sided pricing models as 
“neutral” networks, and pits them against two-sided pricing models, referred 
to as “non-neutral” networks.39  More broadly, two-sided pricing models, by 
their very logic, are incompatible with an open Internet. 
 
38. Figure based on the “Physical representation of Internet interconnection” by kc claffy and D. 
Clark, Platform Models for Sustainable Internet Regulation, TPRC 41: THE 41ST RESEARCH 
CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATION, INFORMATION AND INTERNET POLICY (2013). 
39. See, e.g., John Musacchio, Galina Schwartz & Jean Walrand, A Two-Sided Market Analysis of 
Provider Investment Incentives with an Application to the Net-Neutrality Issue, 8 REV. OF NETWORK 
ECON., no. 1, 2009, at 23. 
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Figure 3: the logic of two-sided pricing applied to data flow: senders of 
contents who enter into “data pass-through” contracts with last-mile ISPs can 
reach last-mile users (top flow); senders do not pay the last-mile ISPs have 
their content blocked at the edge of the last-mile network (bottom flow) 
 
There are thousands of ISPs around the world.40  It is therefore 
impossible for a sender of content to have a direct relationship with them all.  
As a coalition of 190 among the most celebrated of Internet engineers, 
pioneers, and technologists have noted in a move to oppose the recall of net 
neutrality regulation by Chairman Ajit Pai’s FCC in 2017, under a two-sided 
pricing model, “[d]evelopers would have to ensure that their new application 
or protocol would work under different specifications on each of the 
thousands of networks that make up the Internet. Some networks might 
decide to handle data differently depending on whether it represents 
webpages or video. Others might decide to prioritize certain data.  Such a 
haphazard mishmash of different specifications and engineering conditions 
would have made the growth of the Internet as we know it utterly impossible. 
Instead, it would have resulted in a balkanized Internet—one in which each 
ISP was its own private fiefdom, where edge providers had to negotiate with 
the gatekeeper in order to get access to the end users.”41  And these comments 
only referred to large, professional content producers.  In an open-Internet 
world where every end-user is also a sender of content, nobody can 
 
40. No recent and specific data seems available, but as of 2014, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 
estimated the total number at over 10,000, with 7,000 in the U.S. alone.  CIA WORLD FACTBOOK (2014), 
https://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/WorldStats/CIA-Internet-Service-Providers-ISPs.html. 
41. Joint Comments of Internet Engineers, Pioneers, and Technologists on the Technical Flaws in 
the FCC’s Notice of Proposed Rule-making and the Need for the Light-Touch, Bright-Line Rules from 
the Open Internet Order at 32, 82 Fed. Reg. 105 (proposed May 18, 2017) (to be codified at 47 CFR pt. 
8 and 20), WC Docket No. 17-108 (2017), https://www.eff.org/document/internet-engineers-
commentsfcc-nn. 
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realistically expect that the average Internet user casually sending data to the 
world in the form of emails, blog posts, or a personal web page, would have 
the language skills, the legal skills, the time, or the financial resources to set-
up “data-pass-through” contracts with these thousands of ISPs.  If all of these 
ISPs implemented two-sided pricing models, then, the average sender of 
content would be declined access to most of them, while a receiver would 
only be able to access content created by those very few senders who have a 
direct relationship with his particular last-mile ISP.  Such an implementation, 
then, would turn local ISPs into mere equivalents of the walled gardens of 
the 1980s, à la AOL or CompuServe, where the receiver could only access 
content vetted by the guardians of that community’s gate. 
 
Figure 4: In this two-sided pricing internetworking implementation, virtual 
communication between sender and receiver is denied, because the sender 
does not have a direct contractual relationship with, and does not pay, the 
receiver’s ISP.  Each local ISP effectively acts as a gated 
community/walled garden.42 
 
So, while two-sided pricing models have “the possibility of increasing 
efficiency of packet transfers over the Internet, such that more time-sensitive 
packets are given prioritized access,” they “can also effectively exclude 
access to non-paying firms’ content and applications.”43  To reassure the 
public that small senders of content would never be shut out by the receiver’s 
 
42. Figure based on the “Physical representation of Internet interconnection” by kc claffy and D. 
Clark, Platform Models for Sustainable Internet Regulation, TPRC 41: THE 41ST RESEARCH 
CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATION, INFORMATION AND INTERNET POLICY (2013). 
43. Nicholas Economides & Joachim Tag, Network Neutrality on the Internet: A Two-Sided Market 
Analysis, 24 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 91, 92 (2012). 
Winter 2021             FOR AN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACT FOR CYBERSPACE 57 
last mile ISP, ISPs have resorted to the argument of the “dirt road,” which 
consists in saying that while certain high importance / high bandwidth 
packets would be prioritized for the benefit of the consumer in exchange for 
a fee applied to the sender, the ISPs would always leave a slow lane open for 
traffic that is not bandwidth hungry, therefore not impacting at all the 
average sender of content.44  In other words, fear not, all is well.  This 
argument is reminiscent of a scene in the infamous 1978 comedy Animal 
House, where an ROTC cadet, tasked with controlling the flow of attendants 
at a parade gone awry, repeatedly yells “Remain calm, all is well!!,” before 
being trampled by a mad crowd.45  Indeed, suggesting that the dirt road will 
ensure that all content can continue going through even when the sender has 
not entered into a premium contract with the receiver’s ISP is what 
Washington D.C. politicians call an “alternative fact,” as we now 
demonstrate using well-established economic principles and evidence. 
Starting in the mid-19th century, the economic literature on tiered 
pricing has clearly shown that when multiple levels of pricing are introduced 
for a good or service, the quality does not necessarily actually go up from a 
base 100 level (the status quo) as the tiers of service go up; rather, service is 
oftentimes actively degraded from a base 100 level (the status quo now being 
called “top tier,” “premium tier,” or, in the present case, “fast lane”) to create 
new, lower tiers of service.  In other words, the status quo, the “old normal,” 
is not now the lower tier, from which one could get a new and improved 
service for a higher price; rather, the “old normal” is all of a sudden dubbed 
premium, which now costs more, and service is actively degraded from that 
starting place, to create “standard,” or “basic” service.  Airlines have been 
industrious in exploiting this pricing scheme. For example, in 2012, Delta 
Airlines introduced a fourth class of service, called “Basic Economy.”  Basic 
Economy is the old coach class (3rd class), now made even worst by 
preventing the traveler from reserving his seat number before check-in, 
meaning that the traveler is more likely to get a less desirable seat, and 
precluding upgrades even for travelers who would otherwise be eligible 
because of their previously-acquired VIP status.46  Coach, now called “Main 
 
44. See, e.g., Verizon’s statement: “The Commission should allow flexibility for providers to 
negotiate differentiated arrangements or experiment with different service models if they see a customer 
benefit in doing so, even as customers can continue to go anywhere using their selected tier for Internet 
access service and edge providers can rely on that service to reach their customers without the need for 
negotiating with broadband providers  for access  to  end-users.”  Reply Comments of Verizon and 
Verizon Wireless, In the Matter of Framework for Broadband Internet Service, GN Docket No. 10-
127(Sept. 15, 2014), 
https://www.verizon.com/about/sites/default/files/09_15_14_VZ_VZW_Open_Internet_Remand_reply
_comments.pdf (emphasis added). 
45. ANIMAL HOUSE (Universal Pictures 1978). 
46. Delta’s New ‘E’ Basic Economy Fare – No Seat Assignments, Even For Medallions, THE 
POINTS GUY (Mar. 22, 2012), https://thepointsguy.com/2012/03/deltas-new-e-basic-economy-fare-no-
seat-assignments-even-for-medallions/; Katie Genter, How to Survive Basic Economy on Delta Air Lines, 
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Cabin,” has all of a sudden become more expensive, but not better, than it 
used to be; rather, the premium which one now pays to fly coach is simply 
used to maintain the old level of service and avoid having to suffer through 
the inconvenience of the degraded new service class.  The classical example 
of such a tiered pricing system dates back to 1844 France.  In the seminal 
paper “On the measurement of the utility of public works,” Jules Dupuit 
discusses tiered pricing strategies in French railways, at the time divided in 
3 classes. He shows how “first class” is not actually a normal class which 
has been improved (the improvement justifying the premium price), but, 
rather, is the normal class; in turn, classes 2 and 3 are simply class 1 which 
has actively been degraded.  Dupuit writes: 
“It is not because of the few thousand francs which would have to be spent to 
put a roof over the third-class carriages or to upholster the third class seats that 
some company or other has open carriages with wooden benches.  What the 
company is trying to do is to prevent the passengers who can pay the second 
class fare from traveling third class; it hits the poor, not because it wants to 
hurt them, but to frighten the rich.  And it is again for the same reason that the 
companies, having proved almost cruel to the third-class passengers and mean 
to the second-class ones, become lavish in dealing with first-class passengers. 
Having refused the poor what is necessary, they give the rich what is 
superfluous.”47 
Still in the transportation industry, a modern iteration of this system is 
provided by car manufacturer Tesla.  In April 2019, the New York Times 
investigated the differences between the “standard” Tesla Model 3 car, 
which retailed for $35,000 and the “Standard Plus” model, which retailed for 
an extra $4,500.  It found that this set-up allowed “the company to produce 
one version of the Model 3 and use software to limit the battery range and 
turn off features such as heated seats for customers who wanted the $35,000 
model.”48  In other words, Tesla did not build one car (the Standard) and 
upgraded it (the Standard Plus) by physically adding more features to it.  No, 
it built one car in large quantities and then artificially downgraded some of 
them to obtain a lesser model.  Tesla itself admitted that “the ‘standard’ 
Model 3 was actually a software-limited version of the more expensive car… 
That means the range of the [“standard”] car on a full charge is restricted, for 
example, not by battery physics but by software that aims to keep it that 
 
THE POINTS GUY (Aug. 6, 2018), https://thepointsguy.com/guide/how-to-survive-basic-economy-on-
delta-air-lines/. 
47. Arsène Jules Étienne Juvénal Dupuit, De la mesure de l’utilité des travaux publics, ANNALES 
DES PONTS ET CHAUSSEES 8, (2d series, 1844), translated in R.H. Barback, On the measurement of the 
utility of public works, 2 INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PAPERS 83 (1952), reprinted in Kenneth J. Arrow 
& Tibor Scitovsky, eds., READINGS IN WELFARE ECONOMICS 255 (1969). 
48. Neal E. Boudette, Tesla Ends Online Sales of $35,000 Model 3, Creating New Hurdle for 
Buyers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/12/business/tesla-model-3.html/ 
(emphasis added). 
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way.”49  But, thanks to Tesla’s over-the-airwaves update system which can 
enable or disable functionalities in one’s car remotely, one who gets the 
cheaper version can always “pay the difference for a more capable version 
at a later date,”50 i.e. get Tesla to press a button to un-disable existing 
functions for $4,500.  One now easily sees how ISPs can implement a similar 
set-up, by letting customers “upgrade” to a fast lane by simply removing 
artificial road blocks installed on the dirt road.  In fact, evidence indicates 
that this is the most likely scenario going forward, if ISPs are allowed to 
implement two-sided pricing models.  The information industry is already 
rife with examples of what Deneckere and McAfee call “damaged goods,”51 
a practice also known among marketing professionals as “crimping the 
product.”52  Consider the Intel 486 SX processor, which “was initially 
produced in a curious way.  Intel began with a fully functioning 486 DX 
processor, then disabled the math coprocessor, to produce a chip that is 
strictly inferior to the 486 DX but more expensive to produce.  Nevertheless, 
in 1991, the 486 DX sold for $588, and the 486 SX for $333, a little over 
half the price of the chip that is less expensive to produce.”53  Or consider 
the IBM LaserPrinter E, a low cost alternative to the IBM LaserPrinter: 
introduced in 1990, the LaserPrinter E printed 5 page-per-minute, instead of 
the 10 page-per-minute for the more expensive LaserPrinter.  But, as noted 
by PC Magazine, the LaserPrinter E is otherwise exactly similar to the 
LaserPrinter; in fact, it is the LaserPrinter, to which chips have been added 
to actively slow down printing: “PC Lab’s testing of numerous evaluation 
units indicated that the Laser Printer E firmware in effect insert wait states 
to slow print speed…IBM has gone to some expense to slow the LaserPrinter 
in firmware so that it can market it at a lower price.”54  In other words, 
“throughout history and across a broad variety of different industries, 
manufacturers damage some of their production solely for the purpose of 
enhancing their discriminatory abilities.”55  Today, ISPs claim that being 
allowed to apply two-sided pricing models combined with tiered pricing to 
the Internet will lead to increased infrastructure investment on their part.56  
 
49. Zach Wichter, Buying a Tesla Seems Pretty Easy, But There Are a Few Things to Know, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/12/business/buy-tesla-model-3.html/. 
50. Id. 
51. Raymond J. Deneckere & R. Preston McAfee, Damaged Goods, 5 J. ECON. AND MGMT. 
STRATEGY 149 (1996). 
52. Id. at n.1. 
53. Id. at 149 (citing G. Frenkel, For Intel, A 486 Chip by Any Other Name is Still the Same, 8 PC 
WK. S37(Supp. 1991)). 
54. Id. at 153-154 (citing M Jones, Low Cost IBM LaserPrinter E Bears HP LaserJet IIP on 
Performance and Features, 8 PC MAG. 33 (1990)). 
55. Deneckere & McAfee supra note 52, at 151. 
56. See generally Reply Comments of Free Press, In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, 82 
Fed. Reg. 105 (proposed May 18, 2017) (to be codified at 47 CFR pt. 8 and 20), WC Docket No. 17-108 
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Such reasoning was heavily relied upon by FCC Chairman Ajit Pai in his 
successful drive to repeal net neutrality.57  But the economic literature clearly 
shows how the concept of paid prioritization, in a two-sided-pricing Internet 
model, instead of incentivizing ISPs to upgrade existing networks to create 
fast toll roads (the so-called fast lanes), actually reduces the incentive of ISPs 
to upgrade networks, and instead provides ISPs with an incentive “to create 
artificial congestion in the ‘slow lane.’”58  ISPs own behavior seems to 
corroborate economic theory: their investments in wireline broadband 
infrastructure have actually decreased since the 2015 Open Internet Order 
was repealed in 2017.  In contrast, they had increased in the 2015-2017 
period, even though ISPs had warned that net neutrality regulations would 
lead to a decrease in investment.59 
It is also worth noting that if ISPs continuously improved all three lanes, 
the slow lanes would theoretically become good enough that users would not 
have an incentive to pay for the fast lane anymore.  So, just like the French 
train companies in 1844, or Delta Airlines or Tesla automobiles in 2019, 
ISPs instead need to scare customers in order to capture revenue from users 
able to pay a higher price.  ISPs’ incentive is to create a slow lane, not by 
making the fast lane faster, but by artificially congesting the regular lane, the 
degraded result now aptly named “dirt road.”  This is no different than Tesla 
degrading its Model 3 by artificially lowering its top speed with the help of 
a piece of software to extract an extra $4,500 from customers willing to pay 
that extra to get the “fast Tesla,” which actually is the base, unmodified 
Model 3. That the ISP’s fast lane would likely be the regular lane, and the 
“dirt road” the regular lane artificially congested through software 
 
(2017), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10831280772298/Free%20Press%2017-
108%20Reply%20Comments.pdf (discussing ISP’s claims). 
57. See generally Restoring Internet Freedom Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 82 Fed. Reg. 25,568, 
25,570 (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 8, 20), WC Docket No. 17-108 (2017), 
https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-releases-restoring-internet-freedom-order/ (discussing how Pai’s 
FCC in fact went suggested that the 2015 Open Internet Order “has put at risk online investment an 
innovation, threatening the very open Internet it purported to preserve.”). 
58. Nicholas Economides, Why Imposing New Tolls on Third-Party Content and Applications 
Threatens Innovation and will not Improve Broadband Providers’ Investment, in NET NEUTRALITY: 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DEBATE 86, 94, 99 (Jorge Perez Martinez ed., 2010).   
59. Cory Doctorow, After Net Neutrality Repeal, Comcast, Charter and Verizon Cut Investment in 
Their Networks, BOINGBOING (Jan. 23, 2019), https://boingboing.net/2019/01/23/3pct-lower-in-18.html; 
Cory Doctorow, New York Attorney General Expands Law-Enforcement Investigation into the Bots that 
Killed Network Neutrality, BOINGBOING (Oct. 17, 2018), https://boingboing.net/2018/10/17/fcc-v-ny-
ag.html; Comcast Reports 4th Quarter and Full Year 2018 Results, COMCAST (Jan. 23, 2019), 
https://www.cmcsa.com/news-releases/news-release-details/comcast-reports-4th-quarter-and-full-year-
2018-results; Jon Brodkin, Sorry, Ajit: Comcast Lowered Cable Investment Despite Net Neutrality 
Repeal, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 23, 2019), https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/01/sorry-
ajit-comcast-lowered-cable-investment-despite-net-neutrality-repeal/; Reply Comments of Free Press at 
86-208, In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, 82 Fed. Reg. 105 (proposed May 18, 2017) (to be 
codified at 47 CFR pt. 8 and 20) (Aug. 30, 2017), WC Docket No. 17-108 (2017), 
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10831280772298/Free%20Press%2017-108%20Reply%20Comments.pdf. 
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intervention, is not mere speculation.  Not only is it supported by economic 
theory as we have just observed, but ISPs have at times been explicit about 
such strategy.60  For example, Bill Smith, Chief Technology Officer for 
BellSouth, stated that “his company should be allowed to charge a rival 
voice-over-Internet firm so that its service can operate with the same quality 
as BellSouth’s offering.”61  In other words, pay a premium to get the same 
quality as before, or get your bits slowed down.  James Boyle offers a witty 
analogy for such a process of discrimination “between favored and 
disfavored content, giving the former preferential access;” it would be akin 
“to letting the phone company say, ‘we will delay your call to Pizza Hut for 
sixty seconds, but if you want to be put through our featured pizza provider 
immediately, hit nine now!’” 62  Jon Peha, noting that “[e]quipment is already 
being deployed to degrade [quality of service] for this purpose,” provides a 
data-based in-depth discussion of technical variations around this broad 
theme,63 and provides examples where a service that is sufficiently degraded 
cannot in practice compete with others even where the data is not fully 
blocked.64  As if this was not enough, one more crucial issue with such an 
incentive system is that unlike actual freeways where cars will always end 
up getting to their destination, even if it takes longer than the driver wishes 
for, in data transmission, when a network (a road) becomes too congested 
(slow), packets “drop,” that is, get discarded.65  This can lead to “‘congestion 
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collapse’ i.e. periods of  time  when  the  network  [is]  busy  sending  packets  
but  most  of  the  packets  [are] duplicates of previous packets that had 
already been sent” and dropped along the way.66  In practice, this means that 
if the slow lane is slow enough to create enough congestion, the content 
never reaches its destination, and the sender is left resending the same packet 
over and over again, to no avail because the packets keep getting dropped.  
In practice, such effect is similar to being blocked. 
Because the poor are less likely to be able to pay the premium to get the 
base service, small content producers are more likely to be blocked than large 
corporate players.  This causes an issue when it comes to the Internet’s 
contribution to the marketplace of ideas, both in terms of sheer volume of 
information being able to pass through, and  in terms of plurality of views.  
We will return to this problem in Parts IV and V.  For now, let us examine 
through historical examples what happens to the ability of users to access 
content, and the ability of independent content and service providers to 
distribute their creations, when barriers are erected around last-mile 
networks, which is what would happen if two-sided pricing schemes were 
implemented by last-mile ISPs. 
IV.  BACK TO THE 80S: TWO-SIDED PRICING TURNS THE INTERNET 
INTO A SERIES OF WALLED GARDENS  
Commercial online systems, in the 1980s United States, were organized 
as “walled gardens” (also known as “gated communities”), a series of closed 
platform ecosystems, where users could only access the content offered by 
that walled garden.  The three main walled gardens were AOL, CompuServe, 
and Prodigy.67  This organization mirrored early time-sharing systems used 
at universities, where a researcher at Berkeley could only use the Berkeley 
computer, the researcher at MIT the MIT computer, etc.  Bob Taylor, who 
in 1966 headed the Information Processing Techniques Office at the 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), remembers that to access 
time sharing computers in Santa Monica, Berkeley, and MIT, from his office 
in the Pentagon, he needed three different terminals, and three different sets 
of user commands.  As a reaction, “I said, oh, man, it’s obvious what to do: 
If you have these three terminals, there ought to be one terminal that goes 
anywhere you want to go where you have interactive computing. That idea 
is the ARPAnet.”68  
 
66. Bauer, Clark & Lehr, supra note 65, at 22. 
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This idea was further developed by Taylor with his ARPA predecessor 
J.C.R. Licklider, known in particular for his “Galactic Network” concept, “a 
globally interconnected set of computers through which everyone could 
quickly access data and programs from any site.”69  Together, they worked 
on creating a networked “supercommunity,”70 in other words, a network of 
networks: “you don’t have to be half smart to see this thing ought to be 
designed such that you have just one terminal and you can go wherever you 
want to go.”71  These ideas, which many others in the US and elsewhere 
contributed to shaping, are the foundations of the open Internet.  As a result, 
and from a practical standpoint, in an open Internet, “[t]he typical contract 
of an Internet service provider (ISP) with a customer gives the customer 
access to the whole Internet through a physical or virtual pipe of a certain 
bandwidth.”72  This is what enables virtual communication between senders 
and receivers of content connected locally via separate ISPs, as we have just 
discussed in the first two sections. From a pricing and contractual standpoint, 
this exchange of data across separate, interconnected networks is possible 
because each last-mile ISP implements a one-sided pricing model, and does 
not charge outside senders of content or impose on them contractual terms 
before they let the outside content enter their local network.  In contrast, an 
Internet subject to a two-sided pricing model only gives the local ISP’s 
customer access to whatever content that ISP has decided to let into its 
network.  The results of this “enclosure movement of the mind,” to borrow 
from James Boyle,73 is to turn the once-open network of networks into 
something akin to the non-interconnected walled gardens of the 1980s, and, 
therefore, radically changes the nature of the Internet and what users can do 
with it.  Indeed, “[t]he way the Internet has operated so far [was itself] a 
radical departure from the operating principles of the traditional digital 
electronic networks predating it, such as CompuServe, Prodigy, AOL, AT& 
T Mail, MCI Mail and others.  These older electronic networks were 
centralized with very little functionality allowed at the edge of the 
network.”74  In fact, “ISPs like AOL, Compuserve, or Prodigy differentiated 
themselves based on the different information services each provided—
services like chat rooms, bulletin board systems, email, and specialized 
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content only available to an ISP’s own subscribers.  In other words, ISPs 
competed on what information services they actually provided 
themselves.”75  Let us delve into the historical record to appreciate the 
practical import of this last observation for the flow of ideas. 
Most online access providers in the US in the 1980s implemented not 
just time-based but also content-based price discrimination schemes on the 
receiver-side of the market.  That is, they made the receiver pay differently 
for different types of content, in what can be considered an early form of 
zero-rating.  For example, Esther Dyson’s leading industry newsletter 
Release 1.0 reported in 1993 that America Online (AOL) was one of the few 
providers “left that haven’t created a two-tier price structure, separating 
services such as email or airline reservations from others.”76  In contrast, 
while Prodigy had historically provided its service on a flat-fee model 
(except for email), in July 1993, it was to “institute hourly charges (after two 
cumulative free hours) for bulletin boards, Easy Sabre, Dow Jones News 
Retrieval and stock quotes.”77  This is not different from zero-rating models, 
where certain content is treated preferentially by the network operator on the 
user side of the market (for example, T-Mobile treats Spotify better than 
other music services such as Pandora by not counting the use of that service 
towards the end-user’s data cap, and Facebook launched a mobile Internet 
service in India that zero-rated… Facebook, until the practice got banned by 
the local regulator).78 But what made these systems so different from the 
open Internet was not so much the treatment of the receiver of content, but, 
rather, the discrimination they implemented on the content-provider side of 
the market.  Content accessible to customers was curated by the platform 
operator, without due process, and with business considerations dominating 
considerations of user interest.  This led to a paucity of content for users.  For 
example “Prodigy has no chat feature, partly because its network is 
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centralized, partly because of its policy of censoring content: Every message 
goes through a software filter; borderline postings are reviewed by staff, who 
return offensive ones to their originators.”79  Community Link Minitel, a 
joint venture of France Telecom and US West, did provide users access to 
the services available on the French Minitel network, under one caveat: “US 
West censors [the “rose” (adult) services] before they reach the US 
audience.”80  Likewise, 101 Online, another attempt by France Telecom to 
market Minitel in the US, implemented a system where the third-party 
content providers had to bring their content, on a floppy disk, to a downtown 
San Francisco office where 101 Online would upload said content on their 
mainframe. This was one of the reasons that led to a paucity of content on 
that platform, which in turn led to a paucity of users.  As Alan Lundell, editor 
of Byte Magazine and Mondo 2000, would later put it, “I didn’t know anyone 
using it.”81 This historical fact is what led the Internet Engineers, Pioneers, 
and Technologists to comment that absent net neutrality regulations, “the 
result could be a disastrous decrease in the overall value of the Internet82…If 
ISPs could engage in this sort of blocking, throttling, and interference …, it 
would transform the Internet from a permission-less environment (in which 
anyone can develop a new app or protocol and deploy it confident that the 
Internet treats all traffic equally) into one in which developers would first 
need to seek approval from or pay fees to ISPs before deploying their latest 
groundbreaking technology.  Developers and engineers would no longer be 
able to depend on the core assumption that the Internet will treat all data 
equally.  The sort of rapid innovation the Internet has fueled for the past two 
decades would come to a sudden and disastrous halt.”83  Let us again 
consider the situation of non-neutral retail online services in the U.S. in the 
1980s.  The Source, a Readers’ Digest subsidiary, based its selection of 
curated content “based on likely long-term usage rates, as opposed to 
‘attention –getter qualities.’  This relatively new policy,” an industry report 
noted in 1983, “has led to decisions to drop a number of previously 
anticipated new products, such as an electronic encyclopedia.”84  Likewise, 
in 1983, the online version of the twenty-volume World Book Encyclopedia 
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was removed from the walled garden and replaced with the Grolier electronic 
encyclopedia. Overnight, CompuServe users lost access to the World Book 
content.85  The result of these policies of restricting the inflow of content 
onto these platforms was a paucity of content, and, mechanically, a lack of 
value for users.  This disincentivized users from subscribing to online 
services.  Good data are not available for retail online penetration in the 
United States in the 1980s and 1990s, mostly because they are self-reported, 
but a variety of estimates can be recouped.86  In 1991, a U.S. Bureau of 
Census study on computer use in the United States for 1989 did not even 
mention online activities.87  Still in 1991, Al Gore suggested that “services 
like Prodigy, Genie and CompuServe are now in use in almost half a million 
homes,”88 meaning roughly half of one percent of the population in a country 
of then-93 million households.89  In 1993, Esther Dyson estimated that “some 
3 million people are already paying to be in virtual piazzas such as 
CompuServe, Prodigy, and America Online,” meaning roughly 1.15% of a 
population of then-260 million.90  In contrast, Dyson continued, “at 6 million 
low-rent terminals in use … [the French Minitel networks] dwarfs the 
commercial online services.”91  Note the difference in scale: in 1993, the 6M 
French terminals (most of which were shared in households or workplaces) 
served a population of 59M, whereas the 3M U.S. users are out of a 
population of 260M, that same year.92  One of the keys to Minitel’s success 
was that the network was not a walled garden.  Instead, it was relatively open.  
Although there were some administrative hurdles to jump that did create 
some barriers to entry and some chilling effects on speech, in practice, 
anyone determined to do so could attach a server to the network and provide 
lawful content.  When the service provider (France Telecom) pulled the plug 
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on certain services based on allegations of illegal content being provided, 
such decision could be challenged through administrative and judicial 
institutions.  Indeed, for French policymakers, it was clear from the start that 
the creation of content over the Minitel network would not reach critical 
mass if the access provider (in this case, the state-run telephone company) 
imposed restrictions on potential senders of content through personality, 
financial, or content-based contractual restrictions.  In one formulation 
drafted by the prime minister’s office in 1980, the “neutrality of the public 
service of communications” means that “freedom of access to the profession 
of online publisher is the rule, which conversely means that that any 
restrictions [imposed at this level] … would be illegal;” that “there is no legal 
basis upon which [the network operator] could impose … [rules] related to 
the content of the data being transmitted;” and that “[t]o ensure neutrality of 
the public service of telecommunications, it is necessary that the [content 
providers] be in an objective situation vis a vis [the network operator], as 
defined by a law or regulation and not through a contract between the 
[content providers] and [the network operator].  Likewise, the [network 
operator] will be responsible to ensure the freedom … of relationships 
between the user and the information provider.”93  In other words, in this 
early European version, network neutrality means that the network access 
provider (the equivalent of today’s ISP) could not interfere with the 
communication between the receiver and the content provider, and could not 
restrict access to the network to content providers based on the content being 
transmitted or through contractual arrangements.94  Although some easily-
circumventable restrictions were eventually put in place to appease a 
fledging press industry as to who could transmit content over the network, 
by and large, Minitel was open to any content provider, and the access 
service provider did not discriminate between content providers, neither 
based on content, not on ability to pay.  As a result, a relatively uncensored 
Minitel quickly reached critical mass, entered a positive feedback look, and 
afforded its users with access to over 25,000 services at its peak in the mid-
nineties,95 making France then the world’s most wired country.96  In contrast, 
referring to the state of the retail online market in the US, Al Gore noted in 
1991 that there were “valid worries that existing laws do not adequately 
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protect the rights and liberties of computer users to express themselves in the 
new medium.” 97   
Another factor that limited the availability of content on online platforms 
in the United States in the 1980s and early 1990s was not just that they were 
censored, walled gardens, but that they were by and large not connected to 
each other.  So, a CompuServe subscriber could not get access to the content 
available on the AOL platform (let they subscribe to both services), and 
could only get access to content that had received a prior stamp of approval 
by CompuServe.  A subscription to one of these gated communities gave the 
user access to the content available within that particular walled garden only.  
This led to a balkanized market (it was estimated that over 100 ventures 
competed in 1986)98 and a paucity of online content within each individual 
platform.  As a result, online penetration in the US was lagging behind 
countries such as France, where a universal and rather open and neutral 
platform made the country the most wired in the world.99  Al Gore 
recognized the cause of the problem (censored, non-interconnected walled 
gardens), and stressed the importance of the free flow of information for the 
US: “[r]epresentative democracy relies on the still revolutionary assumption 
that the best way for a nation to make political decisions is for all its citizens 
to process the information relevant to their lives and to express their 
conclusions in free speech and in votes that are combined with those of 
millions of others to guide the system as a whole. Communism, by contrast, 
attempted to bring all the information to a large and powerful central 
processor, which collapsed when it was overwhelmed by even more complex 
information.”100  Critiquing corporate censorship and the lack of 
interconnection of online platforms, and speaking of the need for a general 
purpose, open, national network, he continued: “Without federal funding for 
this national network, we would end up with a balkanized system, consisting 
of incompatible parts.  The strength of the national network is that it will not 
be controlled or run by a single entity.  Hundreds of different players will be 
able to connect their own networks to this one… It will be up to federal and 
state policy makers to determine how best to build a universal, high-speed 
network, to reconcile the competing corporate interests and to create a 
network that maximizes the benefits enjoyed by all Americans…  Adequate 
federal investment and leadership will give us the power to leverage the 
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millions of dollars into something greater than the sum of its parts.”101  Al 
Gore understood that interconnection and openness would create network 
effects that would increase the value of going online for users because 
availability of information would be maximized.  Indeed, as noted by the 
Internet Engineers, Pioneers, and Technologists, it is that “openness and 
neutrality that have contributed to the Internet’s explosive growth over the 
past several decades.”102  As the Internet became privatized under the open 
and neutral framework theorized by Gore, users flocked the open Internet 
and abandoned their walled gardens.103  The companies that operated walled 
gardens for the retail market and that nevertheless survived past 1995 were 
those, notably AOL and CompuServe, that opened their gates and switched 
their business model to providing access to the open Internet.104  In doing so, 
they enabled their users to benefit from the explosion of creation and content 
linked to the open nature of the Internet.105  Vint Cerf concurs with Gore: 
“you want to adopt rules that will allow for innovative, new uses of the net 
to come about. You wouldn’t want to have a rule which says that the tel-cos 
[telecommunications companies] can decide what applications you’re 
allowed to put up on the net. I like this permission-less network idea, which 
has allowed companies like Amazon and eBay and Google and Yahoo and 
Skype and others, to exist, as opposed to somebody trying to decide which 
ones should be allowed on . . .. . .  I would say that the walled garden notions 
of AOL, for example, are clear instances of attempts to control content and 
access and to bring people into a place where they only see what you want 
them to see. And the general public has said, ‘We don’t want that.’ The 
trouble here is that a privatized network can’t create—— it cannot keep up 
with the creativity of the open net. That’s really the issue..”106  Cerf 
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concluded that “the walled garden notion has disintegrated.”107  
Unfortunately, that notion is back, and is at the heart of two-sided pricing 
models.  As demonstrated in Part II, two-sided pricing models can only be 
implemented if the last-mile is, by default, a walled garden that blocks 
outside content and whose door will open only in exchange for payment or 
another discrimination mechanism.  The enclosure necessary to make two-
sided pricing models viable for ISPs in an Internetworking context, that is, a 
system where local ISPs block or throttle incoming content by default in 
order to incentivize outside content providers to pay them a fee to get on the 
fast lane, does reverse the trend towards openness and has the potential to 
take us back to the 1980s.108 
This enclosure of online worlds is detrimental to large corporate content 
and service providers such as Netflix.  But Netflix, with its 229 billion dollars 
market cap (as of August 2021), can afford paying a toll to a myriad of last-
mile ISPs, and can afford the lawyers necessary to negotiate such agreements 
or bring lawsuits against oligopolistic ISPs for wrongdoing.  Smaller, for 
profit, content providers, in contrast, have been raising red flags.  Etsy, for 
example, has warned that “[w]e have a small legal team of just four 
attorneys, none of whom are experts in telecommunications law. To bring a 
case, we would have to spend considerable money on outside counsel to 
advise us on the merits of our complaint and marshal expert witnesses. . .. . . 
Meanwhile, if we chose to proceed, we would be up against the broadband 
providers’ expert lawyers and unfathomably deep pockets.”109  If Etsy, with 
its 23 billion dollars market cap (as of July 2021) and its “team of just four 
attorneys,” is indeed at risk of being shut out of the marketplace by the 
implementation of two-sided pricing models, it is not hard to imagine the 
impact of such models on small, not-for-profit content providers, including 
end-users, who actually cannot afford to pay either a toll or the lawyers 
needed to negotiate such toll agreements, and whose packets are at 
significant risk of being dropped from the dirt road.110  These end-users are 
 
107. Id. at 38. 
108. See, e.g., HORTEN, supra note 105, at 71 (“[N]et neutrality is concerned with interference with 
Internet traffic and restrictive practices by network operators which have negative externalities.”). 
109. Comments of Etsy, Inc., In the Matter of Open Internet Remand (July 8, 2014), 81 Fed. Reg. 
3967; Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 1834 (3), 
https://blog.etsy.com/news/files/2014/07/Etsy-Open-Internet-Comments-7.8.14.pdf. 
110. See April Glaser, Comcast Wants You to Think It Supports Net Neutrality While It Pushes for 
Net Neutrality to Be Destroyed, SLATE (Nov. 28, 2017), https://slate.com/technology/2017/11/comcast-
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in fact hope to offer fast-lane service, but at the same price for all. And it might be a price that say, Fox 
News and the New York Times can afford, but one that smaller outlets can’t.”) (emphasis added). 
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no less content providers than Netflix and Etsy. As the U.S. Supreme Court 
noted as early as 1997 in Reno v. ACLU, “[f]rom the publishers’ point of 
view, [the open Internet] constitutes a vast platform from which to address 
and hear from a worldwide audience of millions of readers, viewers, 
researchers, and buyers. Any person or organization with a computer 
connected to the Internet can “publish” information. Publishers include 
government agencies, educational institutions, commercial entities, 
advocacy groups, and individuals.”111  Notice how “commercial entities” and 
“buyers” are only one element in the Supreme Court’s analysis, and how the 
Court focuses on the Internet’s role as an electronic marketplace of ideas.  In 
this context, I will now argue, the FCC made a mistake in opposing “users” 
to “edge-providers” in the 2010, 2015, and 2017 Orders, because this 
opposition reduces the Internet to a commercial marketplace for goods and 
services, and eludes the historic role of the network of networks as a 
marketplace of ideas.112  This risk is exacerbated by the fact that a significant 
part of the rhetoric around Internet policy in the past twenty years has 
revolved around for-profit uses of the Internet.  In the next section, I refocus 
the policy debate on “the little guys,” users/content creators who use the open 
network of network a as an electronic soap box.   
V.  WE HAVE LOST SIGHT OF THE ELECTRONIC SOAP BOX 
When and how the shift in rhetoric happened deserves a study onto 
itself. But one can already trace a key inflection point at the privatization of 
the Internet in 1995 and the short-lived, yet incredibly disruptive and fruitful 
dot.com era.  The “Internet” the Supreme Court described in Reno was what 
Lawrence Lessig called “Net 95,” a short window of time when “[a]ccess 
was open and universal, not conditioned upon credentials.  It was, in a narrow 
sense of the term, an extraordinary democratic moment.  Users were 
fundamentally equal.  Essentially free.”113  With the dot.com era comes the 
tale of the Internet as a new frontier for the maverick entrepreneur.  The hero 
is no longer a user who creates a web page to share his knowledge, or her 
political insights, with the world, but a hot head who homesteads on the new 
frontier to both change the world and make money doing so.  That new 
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rhetoric was captured with gusto by Po Bronson, in his Silicon-Valley-
culture masterpiece The Nudist on the Late Shift: 
BY CAR, BY PLANE, THEY COME. They just show up. They’ve given up their 
lives elsewhere to come here. They come for the tremendous opportunity, 
believing that in no other place in the world right now can one person 
accomplish so much with talent, initiative, and a good idea. It’s a region 
where who you know and how much money you have have never been less 
relevant to success. They come because it does not matter that they are young 
or left college without a degree or have dark skin or speak with an accent. 
They come even if it is illegal to do so. They come because they feel that they 
will regret it the rest of their lives if they do not at least give it a try. They 
come to be a part of history, to build the technology that will reshape how 
people will live and work five or ten years from now. They come for the 
excitement, just to be a part of it. They come because they are competitive by 
instinct and can’t stand to see others succeed more than they. They come to 
make enough money so they will never have to think about money again.  
They are the new breed, Venture Trippers, who get off on the dizzying 
adventure of bloodwork. It is a mad, fertile time. Working has become nothing 
less than a sport here in Superachieverland: people are motivated by the thrill 
of the competition and the danger of losing, and every year the rules evolve to 
make it all happen more quickly, on higher margins, reaching ever more 
amazing sums.  
And rather than choosing not to work hard, the Venture Trippers are taking 
the opposite approach from the Slackers. They’re saying, If I’m going to have 
to make that trade-off, then hell, why the fuck not? I’m young, let’s raise the 
stakes. Let’s up the bet. Let’s make it exciting. Let’s put it all on black. Let ‘em 
roll.114 
In this context, the average Internet user is no longer an active participant in 
“a vast platform from which to address and hear from a worldwide audience 
of millions” (Reno).115  Instead, roles revert to a traditional professional-
media-world dichotomy: content creators on one hand driven by profit, and 
receivers on the other, passive, mere pairs of eyeballs sitting on their couches 
at the confines of networks, receiving content pre-packaged by the new 
heroes of the Internet, the Venture Trippers.  It is not surprising then, given 
this rhetorical shift, that when in 2004, FCC Chairman Powell laid out its 
Guiding Principles for the Industry for Preserving Internet Freedom, and 
paid lip service to the little guy in a heading that on its face sounded almost 
like a manifesto for a socialist revolution (Achieving the Vision: Power to 
the People), he concomitantly reduced the empowering nature of the Internet 
to “consumer empowerment.”  Those who do not create financial value on 
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the networks are no longer recognized as content creators at all, they are now 
mere consumers of the commercial content created by others: 
We must ensure that the various capabilities of these technologies are not used 
in a way that could stunt the growth of the economy, innovation and consumer 
empowerment. . .. . . Broadband networks are impressive generators of 
economic growth, innovation and empowerment. But generators don’t work 
unless they have fuel to burn. Broadband networks are fueled by consumers’ 
hunger for an ever-expanding array of high-value content, applications and 
devices that run over these networks. Easy access to this content and 
technology is bringing more power to the people. . .. . . the possibilities for 
consumer empowerment extend beyond devices. These possibilities arise from 
the Internet’s open architecture, which allows consumers to freely interact 
with anyone around the globe. Musicians and writers, who could never have 
landed a contract with a major record label or publisher, can find - or create 
- audiences for their work. Small town radio stations can reach people who 
have moved to the big city. E-Bay is another good example: gone are the days 
when each of us had only a small group of potential buyers for what we think 
is junk in our garages. Somewhere, in the next state or the next continent, there 
are people who may very well want to buy that “junk” and pay us more than 
we ever dreamed for it. The open Internet has opened markets beyond the 
traditional geographic limitations.116 
The FCC came full circle in the 2010 Open Internet Order (“the 2010 
Order”).117  Where the Reno court had placed commerce last in its analysis 
of what the Internet marketplace supported (“[f]rom the publishers’ point of 
view, [the open Internet] constitutes a vast platform from which to address 
and hear from a worldwide audience of millions of readers, viewers, 
researchers, and buyers”),118 the 2010 Order places it first (“Today the 
Commission takes an important step to preserve the Internet as an open 
platform for innovation, investment, job creation, economic growth, 
competition, and free expression.”)119  Where the Reno user was considered 
a full fledge publisher, the 2010 FCC’s user is a mere consumer.  Where the 
Reno court considered the Internet to be a marketplace of ideas, the 2010 
FCC characterizes it mostly as a marketplace for commerce: “Each round of 
innovation increases the value of the Internet for broadband providers, edge 
providers, online businesses, and consumers. Continued operation of this 
virtuous circle, however, depends upon low barriers to innovation and entry 
by edge providers, which drive end-user demand.  Restricting edge 
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providers’ ability to reach end users, and limiting end users’ ability to choose 
which edge providers to patronize, would reduce the rate of innovation at the 
edge and, in turn, the likely rate of improvements to network 
infrastructure.”120  In FCC vernacular, “End user” refers to any individual or 
entity that uses a broadband Internet access service; we sometimes use 
“subscriber” or “consumer” to refer to those end users that subscribe to a 
particular broadband Internet access service. . .. . . We use “edge provider” 
to refer to content, application, service, and device providers, because they 
generally operate at the edge rather than the core of the network.”121  The 
FCC recognizes that “These activities are not mutually exclusive. For 
example, individuals who generate and share content such as personal blogs 
or Facebook pages are both end users and edge providers.”122  Yet, even in 
the face of the fact that all end-users are content creators (“edge-providers”), 
the FCC persists in opposing the two, because, it argues, “this basic 
taxonomy provides a useful model for evaluating the risk and magnitude of 
harms from loss of openness.”123  It may be so, but only to the extent that 
“harms” are measured in dollar amounts potentially lost by commercial 
entities whose product distribution is being hindered by ISP’s two-sided 
pricing schemes.  For the FCC to oppose (consumerist) end-users to 
(commercial) edge providers contributes to reinforcing the narrative of the 
Internet being mostly important to commerce, and to eluding the significance 
of the Internet as an integral tool of culture and democratic progress.  This 
framing by the FCC is not surprising, as the development of the information-
industrial complex has led to a “symbiosis between the states and the 
corporations,” where “the metrics for policy success became aligned to those 
of the markets.”124  In other words, as Monica Horten put it, “[t]here is 
therefore a sharp political divide between the user-empowerment narrative 
and the market-led perspective of policymaking.”125  But this dominant 
framing creates a major issue, because, as Janet Abbate noted, “[h]istories 
that focus on the dominant players, those with the resources to create 
expensive new technologies, run the risk of privileging their visions in a 
contemporary Internet system that has, and should take into account, a much 
broader scope and constituency. Definitions that locate the defining features 
of the Internet in situated social practices can help challenge the claim of 
hardware- and software-builders to speak for the Internet. In the arena of 
 
120. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
121. Id. at 3 n.2. 
122. Id. at 11.   
123. Id. 
124. MONICA HORTEN, THE CLOSING OF THE NET 16-18 (2016); see generally SHAWN M. POWERS 
& MICHAEL JABLONSKI, THE REAL CYBER WAR: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNET FREEDOM 
(2015) (discussing the information-industrial complex and its development). 
125. HORTEN, supra note 124, at 19. 
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public policy, histories that frame the Internet as the evolution of the public 
sphere can support arguments for protecting freedom of speech or subsidized 
public access in a way that histories framing the Internet as an entertainment 
service or a vehicle for private expression would not.”126  Conversely, the 
FCC’s vernacular, which was used again in the 2015 and 2017 Orders, 
further eludes thinking about the impact of two-sided pricing models on 
these content-creating, non-commercial, end-users.   
Such opposition between end users and edge providers is easy to grasp 
for most, because it makes the Internet fit into old-world media categories, 
within a familiar framework where people are either producers or consumers. 
But this radio-TV-world analysis is far outdated.  In reality, “end-users” are 
themselves all publishers. Whether we publish a personal website, a blog, 
shout an announcement to a listserv, or send an email, we are no less content 
providers than Netflix, CNN.com, or MLB.com.  There is a difference in 
degree, but not in nature, as far as the definition of a publisher is concerned.  
This false dichotomy is reinforced by narratives put forth by many influential 
pro-net neutrality activists themselves.  Just like Chairman Powell had 
stressed that we needed “Power to the People” because “there are people who 
may very well want to buy that ‘junk’ and pay us more than we ever dreamed 
for it,” if only we get access to the “Internet’s open architecture” and to E-
Bay, so did Chad Dickerson, CEO of Etsy, in a well-publicized testimony 
before the US House of Representatives in 2015.  After reminding the 
lawmakers that “Etsy is an online marketplace where you can buy handmade 
and vintage goods from artists, designers, and collectors around the world 
. . .. . . 88% are women. Most are sole proprietors who work from home, and 
they depend on Etsy income to pay their bills and support their families,” 
and that “Our members understand what’s at stake,” he went on to tell the 
teary-eye story of Tina, an Etsy seller from Spring Valley, Illinois, [who] 
captured the sentiments of many micro-businesses when she wrote, “We rely 
on all my sales to make ends meet. Any change in those and it’s the 
difference between balanced meals for my children and cereal for dinner.”127  
Aside of this public relations exercise in benevolence by the CEO of a 
publicly-traded company, generally, most of mainstream media’s reporting 
on net neutrality violations covered commercial, for-profit enterprises, from 
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Skype128 to Netflix129 to Google Voice,130 whose content or apps were 
blocked by wireline or wireless ISPs.131 
Such coverage does not mean that small and/or not-for-profit speakers 
have not suffered in an era devoid of enforceable net neutrality rules, but, 
rather, that these content creators do not make the news, and neither do 
political speakers who are shut out of the marketplace of ideas, without due 
process, by oligopolistic ISPs.  Even John Oliver, whose contribution to 
putting the importance of net neutrality in the public eye and shifting FCC 
Chairman Wheeler’s position on the topic is well documented and should 
not be understated,132 fell into the trap of reducing the Internet to a 
consumerist platform.  To illustrate the harm caused by the implementation 
of two-sided pricing models by ISPs, he jokingly suggested that his “startup 
video streaming service, Nutflix, a one-stop resource for videos of men 
getting hit in the nuts,” wouldn’t be able to compete with wealthy companies 
like Netflix who are able to pay the ISPs’ tolls.  While hilarious, this constant 
representation of the Internet as a place focused on commerce and mindless 
entertainment marginalizes speakers who are not part of the capitalist 
mainstream, these very content creators who have historically made the 
Internet interesting before it became mostly about online shopping, reruns of 
The Office, and cute cat videos.133  Obfuscating the role of average Internet 
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users in creating content that has value besides sheer entertainment makes it 
more difficult to think about the impact of two-sided pricing models on 
politics, community involvement, the arts, and on democracy in general.  
And that impact is more than speculation by radical activists or theoretical 
ramblings by law, economics, history, or computer science academics.  
There is plenty of evidence that political speech, on both ends of the 
spectrum, from anti-Iraq-war groups to pro-choice and white-nationalist 
activists, have been shut out of the publishing game by American ISPs.134  
 
thousands of people in the streets at a moment’s notice, it’s because ISPs aren’t allowed to block their 
messages or websites . . . . The mainstream media have long misrepresented, ignored and harmed people 
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bypass traditional media gatekeepers. Without Net Neutrality, ISPs can block speech and prevent 
dissident voices from speaking freely online. Without Net Neutrality, people of color are losing a vital 
platform.  And without Net Neutrality, millions of small businesses that people of color own won’t be 
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“Nerdcore” music star Monzy, who represents a style of music that 
celebrates geek culture,135 might as well have been speaking in the name of 
large US ISPs addressing their “end-users” acting as content providers when 
he wrote, in his 2006 hit Kill Dash Nine: 
I’ll chown your home and take your access away 
Comin’ straight outta Stanfurd, ain’t nobody tougher 
Control-X, Control-C, I’ll discard your fuckin’ buffer 
You’re outside your scope, son, close them curly brackets 
Cause I drop punk-ass bitches like a modem drops packets136  
Indeed, “punk-ass bitches” content creators that do not have the favor of 
local ISPs get dropped from other users’ sight when the ISP-controlled 
network gateways and routers drop their content’s packets to enforce two-
sided pricing models.  But they do not have John Oliver on hand to defend 
them, because they are not entertainment-worthy.  As Oliver himself put it 
sarcastically, “if you want to do something evil, put in inside something 
boring.”137  And the fate of democracy, to most, being much more boring 
than cute cat videos, Twitter memes, or Instagram selfies, small political, 
educational, or artistic speakers have not generally been placed under the 
limelight.  The consumerist narrative has so far triumphed over the user-
empowerment narrative in Washington, D.C. policy circles.  The result has 
been to obfuscate the essential role of the little guy in contributing to the 
marketplace of ideas.  But in July 2021, both President Biden’s Executive 
Order, and former President Trump’s lawsuit against Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube, have put the importance of political speech back into the public 
eye, and there is therefore momentum for net neutrality legislation.  In the 
remainder of this article, I explore what traditional political theory in the 
realm of freedom of speech, and the body of case law it has grounded, can 
tell us for thinking about net neutrality policy from a normative standpoint, 
and fight the depletion of ideas in the marketplace caused by two-sided 
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pricing models.  Drawing particularly from influential political science 
scholar Alexander Meiklejohn, and the landmark case Pruneyard Shopping 
Center v. Robins,138 I argue that both controlling political philosophy and 
Supreme Court precedent give legitimacy to an Anti-Discrimination Act for 
Cyberspace which would pass constitutional muster. 
VI.  FIGHTING THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS’ DEPLETION BY 
EXPANDING FREEDOM OF SPEECH THROUGH LEGISLATION 
I have demonstrated in Parts I through IV that the implementation of two-
sided pricing models by last-mile ISPs would drastically affect the way that 
the public Internet has historically functioned, because such an 
implementation requires turning last mile ISPs, by default, into walled 
gardens – the gates of which will only open upon payment by, or other 
discriminatory arrangement with, select content providers.  I have also 
shown that despite their claims that such schemes will boost infrastructure 
investments for the benefit of users, and that nobody’s speech will be 
suppressed thanks to “dirt roads,” ISPs’ incentive actually is to degrade 
service for the majority of users, in order to extract payments by a few large 
content providers that have the ability to do so.  The likely result of such an 
implementation, then, is for small speakers to be shut out of the publishing 
game, and for the once-open Internet to drift back towards walled gardens 
models of the 1980s where content accessible to the users was drastically 
limited, and where freedom of expression was curtailed without due process.  
The result is a depletion of the marketplace of ideas.  What, then, can be done 
to protect freedom of expression over the open Internet, and the overall 
wealth of networks?139  I suggest that we turn to traditional American 
political philosophy and to the existing body of case law to find the answer. 
One of the most important theories that supports free speech jurisprudence 
in the United States is that of the “marketplace of ideas.”140  This theory, 
which can be traced back to John Milton and John Stuart Mill, generally 
suggests that good ideas will emerge and prevail over bad ideas, but only if 
 
138. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
139. See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 29-127 (2006) (discussion of 
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acknowledge the tension between an ‘instrumental’ and a ‘dignitary’ vision of free speech.”). In this 
article, I chose not to oppose the two theories but to rather focus on what we can learn from Meiklejohn, 
with no demerit for Emerson. 
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all ideas can freely confront each other in a marketplace – follows that 
government curtailment of speech deemed nefarious by a token ruler – no 
matter how good the ruler’s intentions - is bad policy, because “wrong” 
speech does not get to be exposed and is more likely to proliferate in the 
underground than if it were exposed under the light of rational debate.141  
Free speech theorist Alexander Meiklejohn provided a modern articulation 
of this theory within the framework of the U.S. Constitution.  In his 1955 
Testimony before Congress on The Meaning of the First Amendment, he 
stated that the First Amendment to the Constitution is directed against the 
“mutilation of the thinking process of the community,” that “in our popular 
discussion, unwise ideas must have a hearing as well as wise ones, dangerous 
ideas as well as safe, un-American as well as American,” and that 
“[s]uppression is always foolish.  Freedom is always wise.  That is the faith, 
the experimental faith, by which we Americans have undertaken to live.”142  
The impact of Meiklejohn’s thought is evident in the Supreme Court’s case 
law on political speech since the middle of the 20th century.  For example, in 
Terminiello v. Chicago,143 the Supreme Court overturned on First 
Amendment grounds the conviction for breach of the peace of a bigot who 
had made inflammatory comments which resulted in a riot.  In the majority 
opinion, Justice Douglas stated that “a function of free speech under our 
system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high 
purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with 
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often 
provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions 
and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. 
That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute . . .. . . is nevertheless 
protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce 
a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above 
public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest . . .. . . There is no room under 
our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead 
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to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political 
or community groups.”144  The Supreme Court of the United States further 
implicitly confirmed the importance of Meiklejohn’s political thought on its 
case law when it refused to grant certiorari in the so-called Skokie case.145  In 
June, 1977, the National Socialist Party of America applied for a parade 
permit from the Village of Skokie, Illinois.  Of the population of Skokie, a 
Chicago suburb, the majority was Jewish, and a substantial number were 
actual holocaust survivors.  The nazis planned to assemble in front of the 
Village Hall, to “wear uniforms with swastikas,” and to “carry placards 
proclaiming free speech for white persons.”146  The Village denied the 
permit.  The nazis sued the Village, and the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois declared the Village’s attempt to prevent the 
parade unconstitutional under the First Amendment and provided injunctive 
relief.147  The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed.148  The US Supreme Court denied certiorari because, as a 
constitutional matter, it was what has been dubbed “an easy case.”149  This 
denial to further hear the case was in itself extremely significant, because 
nazi speech is so ignominious, and the consequences of its implementation 
so horrific, that most sensible people deem it to be “wrong.”150  Yet, in 
denying certiorari and confirming the lower courts’ injunctions to let the 
nazis parade, the U.S. Supreme Court made it clear that the freedom of 
speech was a value so integral to the US democratic way of life as to 
withstand virtually any form of legal balancing.151  In doing so, it implicitly 
confirmed that Meiklejohn’s interpretation of the First Amendment is indeed 
a controlling force under positive law.  Aryeh Neier, the holocaust survivor 
who represented the nazis in court and fought for their First Amendment 
right to parade, provided a pre-Internet, yet modern, formulation of the 
marketplace of ideas theories as applied to the utmost heinous speech: 
 
144. Id. 
145. Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). 
146. Id. at 917. 
147. Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (1978). 
148. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (1978). 
149. See Lee Bollinger & Aryeh Neier, The Skokie Legacy: Reflections on an ‘Easy Case’ and Free 
Speech Theory, 80 MICH. L. REV. 617 (1982); Martin H. Redish, New Film Explores Skokie’s Battle with 
Neo-Nazis, WTTW (Jan. 24, 2013), https://news.wttw.com/2013/01/24/new-film-explores-skokie-s-
battle-neo-nazis. 
150. Carl Cohen, Skokie—The Extreme Test, THE NATION, Apr. 15, 1978, at 422, 428.  (“[t]he 
principle that ‘Congress shall make no law’ . . . .  is perennially tested by American Nazis . . . . By 
presenting the extreme case, these Nazis provide an instructive test of a very good principle.”); see also 
Julien Mailland, The Blues Brothers and the American Constitutional Protection of Hate Speech: 
Teaching the Meaning of the First Amendment to Foreign Audiences, 21 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 443, 
450 n.49 (2013). 
151. Julien Mailland, Freedom of Speech, the Internet, and the Costs of Control: The French 
Example, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1179, 1183 (2001). 
82 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 44:1 
I supported free speech for Nazis when they wanted to march in Skokie in 
order to defeat Nazis. Defending my enemy is the only way to protect a free 
society against the enemies of freedom . .. . .. . . I could not bring myself to 
advocate freedom of speech in Skokie if I did not believe that the chances are 
best for preventing a repetition of the Holocaust in a society where every 
incursion on freedom is resisted.152 
As the Skokie case illustrates, Meiklejohn’s work in decrypting the meaning 
of the First Amendment has provided an ideological basis for fundamental 
cases expanding the right to free speech for Americans to an extent 
unmatched in any other country.  A core point to be made here is that the 
First Amendment is itself a regulation.  It is a regulation that frees, because 
it prevents those in control of the physical facility where speech is to be 
conducted from discriminating against speech they do not favor by simply 
cutting access of disfavored speakers to said physical facility.  This is 
precisely what the 2015 Open Internet Order did when it banned blocking, 
throttling, and paid prioritization.  In that sense, such net neutrality regulation 
is, simply, an anti-discrimination act for cyberspace, one that brings the 
spirit of the First Amendment into the digital age. 
Yet, in today’s politically-polarized America, the very idea of net 
neutrality regulation has been spun to mean something different. “Pro-
freedom” politicians such as Senator Ted Cruz have claimed that “‘Net 
Neutrality’ is Obamacare for the Internet; the Internet should not operate at 
the speed of government.” 153  When Chairman Ajit Pai’s FCC issued the 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that set the recall of net neutrality 
regulations in the 2017 Order in motion (“the 2017 NPRM”),154 it framed the 
2015 Order as a government takeover over the Internet.  The decision to 
(properly) reclassify ISPs as common carriers under Title II of the 1996, the 
NPRM declared, “represented a massive and unprecedented shift in favor of 
government control of the Internet.”155  The very title of the NPRM, “In The 
Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom,” is a rhetorical artifice used to suggest 
that the 2015 Open Internet Order had diminished freedom on the Internet, 
and to portray proponents of net neutrality as opponents of a free Internet.  
The 2017 NPRM, I have argued elsewhere, is in fact “little more than a 
political document pursuing a political agenda rather than a well-reasoned 
legal analysis objectively applying the facts as required by the 
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Administrative Procedures Act.”156  In fact, the NPRM embraced “the same 
rhetorical tools as the broadband Internet service providers and their industry 
trade associations, which is to confuse the public and suggest that they are 
the real supporters of an ‘open Internet.’”157  But that rhetoric is flawed.  
Regulation can free.  This seemingly radical-and-internally-inconsistent 
suggestion is actually neither radical nor internally inconsistent.  In 2010, 
The Economist, a newspaper that can hardly been accused of publishing 
socialist pamphlets or being a breeding ground for the radical left, took a 
stance in favor of Internet regulation.  It specifically pushed for requiring 
“telecom operators to open their high-speed networks to rivals on a 
wholesale basis as is the case almost everywhere in the industrialized world” 
(but something the Obama FCC itself had not dared even considering, as it 
did forbear from a majority of provisions of Title II of the 1996 Act in the 
2015 Open Internet Order).158  The conservative British outlet wrote: “This 
newspaper has always championed free trade, open markets, and vigorous 
competition in the physical world.  The same principles should be applied on 
the Internet as well.”159  The Economist editorialists understand well, 
contrary to what they call “those on the right [who] see net neutrality as a 
socialist plot to regulate the Internet,”160 that regulation, when well designed, 
can indeed restore free trade and open markets when these have been 
compromised (in that case, by “the lack of competition in broadband 
access.”)161  Indeed, what holds true in the marketplace of goods and services 
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also holds true in the marketplace of ideas.  And the digital open networks 
of networks had become just the place to realize the vision of the likes of 
John Milton.  Consider this classic, 1945 statement by Justice Jackson: 
[t]he very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority 
from assuming a guardianship of the public mind through regulating the press, 
speech, and religion. In this field every person must be his own watchman for 
truth, because the forefathers did not trust any government to separate the true 
from the false for us.162 
Layer over it a statement made 70 years later by Apple co-founder Steve 
Wozniak: 
The Internet when it first came, it was a breath of fresh air, it was so free, 
nobody owned the Internet space. . .. . . it was worldwide, it was people to 
people, it was like we little people of the world all of a sudden had this 
incredible resource and we didn’t have to go through other people selling it to 
us… 
I think that a lot of online social interactions will be curbed . . .. . . I fear . . .. . . 
that the gatekeepers, those who can turn on and off switches, allow certain 
things, disallow other things, allow who gets to send me data . . .. . . rather 
than anyone having equal say so of reaching me, yeah, I fear that very strongly 
. . .. . . especially net neutrality, issues like that. . .. . .  Internet freedom is 
being interfered with in major ways, and it shouldn’t. . .. . .  I’m an optimist, 
and I believe we can move more and more towards net neutrality.  The trouble 
is, a lot of it has to be enforced by the government, and conservative types and 
libertarian types say “government shouldn’t have any say and control over 
that, that takes away our freedom.”  Wrong!  It takes away the freedom of the 
companies that are taking away the freedom from us.  Every freedom we have 
in the United States, every one of them, was given to us by Congressional 
regulation, it’s called the Bill of Rights.  That is what gives us our freedom, 
and yet it was from the government, it was government regulation.  No, there 
are times when government regulation says “you will not impede with the 
Internet neutrality of the users.”163 
Wozniak’s statement is simply an Internet-age reformulation of Justice 
Jackson’s 1945 statement, and of Meiklejohn’s interpretation of the First 
Amendment.  For Meiklejohn went much farther than suggesting that 
“unwise ideas must have a hearing.”164  While arguing against governmental 
suppression of speech, he concomitantly provided an argument in favor of 
positive government action that would expand the freedom of speech through 
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regulation.  Commenting on the meaning of the sentence “Congress shall 
make no law … abridging the freedom of speech,” Meiklejohn noted: 
[B]y those words, Congress is not debarred from all action upon freedom of 
speech. Legislation which abridges that freedom is forbidden, but not 
legislation to enlarge and enrich it.  The freedom of the mind which befits the 
members of a self-governing society is not a given and fixed part of human 
nature. It can be increased and established by learning, by teaching, by the 
unhindered flow of accurate information, by giving men health and vigor and 
security, by bringing them together in activities of communication and mutual 
understanding.  And the federal legislature is not forbidden to engage in that 
positive enterprise of cultivating the general intelligence upon which the 
success of self-government so obviously depends.  On the contrary, in that 
positive field the Congress of the United States has a heavy and basic 
responsibility to promote the freedom of speech.”165 
A net neutrality regulation that prevents blocking, throttling, and paid 
prioritization does not abridge the freedom of speech of Internet users; it 
instead reinforces it, in a world where the marketplace of ideas has physically 
shifted from the public square to a privately-owned apparatus of copper or 
fiberoptic cable. Such regulation is simply a non-discrimination act for 
cyberspace, which protects against the “mutilation of the thinking process of 
the community,” which Meiklejohn warned Congress against in 1955.166  His 
words have never been more modern and relevant. 
But would such a regulation by Congress survive judicial scrutiny when it 
would clearly – at least to a feeble extent – interfere with ISPs’ property 
rights, and potentially be construed as forced speech in violation of the First 
Amendment?167  There indeed is legal precedent supporting the 
constitutionality of such expansion of freedom of speech through regulation, 
even in the face of private-property rights recognized over the facility 
through which the speech is expressed.  I have already argued elsewhere that 
the FCC, if it were to impose net neutrality regulations on ISPs under the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, either under Section 706 in conjunction 
with Title I, or under Title II, would likely pass constitutional muster if 
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challenged on First Amendment grounds.168  Said opinion has been cited by 
the FCC in the 2105 Open Internet Order in support of enforcing net 
neutrality.169  The purpose of the present article, however, is not to discuss 
fine points of administrative and constitutional law as they apply to the FCC 
under the 1996 Act, but, rather, to ground a new net neutrality law in a First 
Amendment political theory recognized as controlling by positive law.  If 
Congress itself was to cut the Gordian Knot by passing new legislation from 
a blank slate, could Meiklejohn’s insights and judicial precedent regarding 
political speech ground an Anti-Discrimination Act for Cyberspace?  To 
think about this question, I turn to a leading Supreme Court case infused with 
Meiklejohn’s First Amendment insights, Pruneyard Shopping Center v. 
Robins.170   
In Pruneyard, a group of California high school students had set up a 
table in the central courtyard of a privately-owned shopping center named 
Pruneyard.  They peacefully distributed pamphlets and solicited signatures 
for a petition against a United Nations resolution against “Zionism.”  A 
security guard soon asked them to leave.  They complied, and subsequently 
filed a lawsuit which sought to enjoin the shopping center from denying them 
access to its facility for the purpose of circulating their petition.171  After 
facing a couple of setbacks in the lower courts, the teenagers prevailed before 
the California Supreme Court.  The state high court ruled that they were 
allowed to conduct their speech activities on Pruneyard’s private property, 
because the California Constitution contains a positively phrased provision 
that actively protects “speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in 
shopping centers even when the centers are privately owned.”172  In deciding 
that the California Constitution gave the teenagers a “right to solicit 
signatures on [the private mall’s] property in exercising their state rights of 
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free expression and petition,” the state’s high court rejected the mall’s “claim 
that recognition of such a right violated [their] ‘right to exclude others,’ 
which is a fundamental component of their federally protected property 
rights.”173  The US Supreme Court deferred to the state’s high court’s 
construction of the state constitution as protecting “speech and petitioning, 
reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the centers are 
privately owned.”174  It then addressed the two federal constitutional 
questions presented: “whether state constitutional provisions, which permit 
individuals to exercise free speech and petition rights on the property of a 
privately owned shopping center to which the public is invited, violate the 
shopping center owner’s property rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments or his free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.”175  In a sweeping 9-0 decision, it concluded that neither the 
Fifth nor the First Amendment rights of the privately owned facility had been 
violated by the state law.  This decision is particularly relevant to the debate 
on net neutrality, because a privately-owned mall which serves, de facto, as 
a public forum in the analog world, bears striking similarities with a 
privately-owned set of pipes and switches which also serve, de facto, as a 
public forum in the digital age.   
On the Fifth Amendment question, the Pruneyard Court found that “a 
State, in the exercise of its police power, may adopt reasonable restrictions 
on private property so long as the restrictions do not amount to a taking 
without just compensation or contravene any other federal constitutional 
provision.”176  The Supreme Court found the California Constitution 
federally permissible in this regard.  In doing so, it noted that “[t]he 
requirement that [the shopping center] permit [the outside speakers] to 
exercise state-protected rights of free expression and petition on shopping 
center property does not amount to an unconstitutional infringement of 
appellants’ property rights under the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
appellants having failed to demonstrate that the ‘right to exclude others’ is 
so essential to the use or economic value of their property that the state-
authorized limitation of it amounted to a ‘taking.’”177  A detailed description 
of ISPs 5th Amendment rights is far outside the scope of this paper,178 but it 
is generally worth noting that the very business model of ISPs, just like the 
mall, is to provide service indiscriminately to the public, and to provide 
access for the customers to the whole Internet.  Any “right to exclude others” 
would therefore be antithetical to the ISPs’ business model, just like it was 
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176. Id. at 75. 
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178. On this topic, see generally Cherry & Mailland, supra note 167. 
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in Pruneyard.  In this sense, then, the situation of the Pruneyard mall and 
ISPs vis a vis speech activities conducted over their facility and which they 
deem undesirable are very similar.  The Pruneyard’s Fifth Amendment 
rationale would therefore likely support an Anti-Discrimination Act for 
Cyberspace passing constitutional muster. 
In holding that the California law passed First Amendment muster and 
that positive law did not “ex proprio vigore limit a State’s authority to 
exercise its police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own constitution 
individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal 
Constitution,”179 the US Supreme Court applied a three-prong test: “[t]he 
shopping center, by choice of its owner, is not limited to the personal use of 
appellants, and the views expressed by members of the public in passing out 
pamphlets or seeking signatures for a petition thus will not likely be 
identified with those of the owner. Furthermore, no specific message is 
dictated by the State to be displayed on appellants’ property, and appellants 
are free to publicly dissociate themselves from the views of the speakers or 
handbillers.”180  Just like with the Fifth Amendment issue, with regard to the 
First Amendment, the similarities between the shopping center and ISPs are 
striking.  When it comes to the first prong, that the physical facility not be 
limited to the personal use of its owners, just like in Pruneyard, the Internet 
access facilities maintained by the ISPs are not limited to the personal use of 
the ISPs.  Quite the contrary, in fact, since the very business model of the 
IPSs is to carry the speech of others, to let others use the ISPs’ privately 
owned facilities to distribute their information.  As Verizon’s lawyers 
themselves noted in a court filing, “the Internet service provider performs a 
pure transmission or “conduit” function . . .. . . This function is analogous to 
the role played by common carriers in transmitting information selected and 
controlled by others. Traditionally, this passive role of conduit for the 
expression of others has not created any duties or liabilities under the 
copyright laws.”181  In other words, according to Verizon itself, an ISP 
cannot be liable for copyright violation for the infringing speech of others 
that is conducted over its facility, because it is obvious that the ISP is not the 
speaker.  Consequently, referring to the Supreme Court’s second prong, the 
views expressed by online speakers “thus will not likely be identified with 
those of the owner” of the Internet access facility.  Therefore, Pruneyard’s 
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second test would likely be met in the case of a net neutrality law prohibiting 
blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization by the ISPs.182 
Finally, regarding Pruneyard’s third prong, that no specific message be 
dictated by the State to be displayed on the facility owner’s property, and 
that the facility owner be free to publicly dissociate themselves from the 
views of the speakers, a net neutrality law prohibiting blocking, throttling, 
and paid prioritization by the ISPs would simply be an anti-discrimination 
act for cyberspace and would in no way dictate the ISPs to distribute any 
message over their facilities.  ISPs would not be required for example, to 
display a “live free or die” banner on the computer screen of their customers 
when a web browser is opened, something that would likely be 
unconstitutional under Wooley v. Maynard.183  And, ISPs would remain free, 
as they already do today, “to publicly disassociate themselves from the views 
of the speakers” using their facility.  Compare Verizon’s own disclaimer, in 
this regard: “Verizon assumes no responsibility for . .. . .. . . any Content 
. .. . .. . . and . .. . .. . . Verizon does not endorse any advice or opinion 
contained therein,”184 with those placated outside supermarkets and malls in 
California as a direct result of Pruneyard:  
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Figure 5: A disclaimer placated outside of a California Wal-Mart reads: 
“Wal-Mart apologizes for any inconvenience caused by solicitors outside our 
store.  We do not advocate their view or methods of expression.  Their 
presence on our property is currently permitted by California Court 
Decisions.”185 
 
In both cases, the facility owner actively ensures that the speech expressed 
by third-parties over the facility “will not likely be identified with [the 
speech] of the [facility’s] owner.”  The third prong of the Pruneyard First 
Amendment test would therefore also easily be met, if Congress passed an 
Anti-Discrimination Act for Cyberspace: “no specific message is dictated by 
the State” when a law is designed to guarantee neutrality of treatment of all 
speakers by the facility owner and is therefore, by definition, content 
neutral.186 
In ruling in Pruneyard, the Supreme Court embraced Alexander 
Meiklejohn’s interpretation of the First Amendment, which stressed that 
“[l]egislation which abridges that freedom [of speech] is forbidden, but not 
legislation to enlarge and enrich it.”   
 
185. Photograph of disclaimer outside a Wal-Mart store in Mountain View, California (Feb. 12, 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
Privately-owned Internet access facilities have become, de facto, the new 
public square.  That public square, in the early days of the open Internet, was 
subject to a one-sided pricing model, which ensured access to all speakers to 
it, on a neutral basis.  The implementation of two-sided pricing models by 
ISPs, by its very economic and technical logic, instead creates walled 
gardens.  These walled gardens lead to a depletion of ideas in the 
marketplace.  This trend is exacerbated by a shift, in the policy realm, from 
a user-empowerment narrative that focused, as the Reno court did, on the 
user as publisher, to one that reduces the empowering nature of the Internet 
to “consumer empowerment.”  It is time to reintroduce “the little guys on 
their electronic soapboxes” in the policy narrative.  In this realm, Alexander 
Meiklejohn’s thought, and cases such as Pruneyard, have never been so 
relevant.  Not just for Netflix and Etsy, but for the myriad of small speakers 
using the electronic soap box to perform in the public sphere and maintain 
the vibrant marketplace of ideas which is at the core of First Amendment 
jurisprudence and of American political philosophy ideals generally.  This 
has not escaped FCC Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel: we have “a duty 
to protect what has made the Internet the most dynamic platform for free 
speech ever invented.  It is our printing press.  It is our town square.  It is our 
individual soapbox.”187  It is urgent for Congress to step up and guarantee, 
through new legislation, that political speakers will be free to setup their soap 
box on the ISP-maintained digital public square: an Anti-Discrimination Act 
for Cyberspace.  Controlling political philosophy rhetoric in the field of free 
speech and Supreme Court precedent certainly give legitimacy to this path. 
  
 
187. Statement of Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel, Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 
GN Docket No. 14-28, https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-15-24A4.pdf. 
92 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 44:1 
*** 
